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NOTE OF TRANSMITTAL
This report is.prepared for the Office of Application
under Mod. 2 of Contract NASW-2558. It represents an
investigation of the value of improved (ERS) information by.
empirically estimating the effects of such improved information
on crop inventory holding for U.S. Domestic consumption of
wheat.
New estimates of a U.S. demand function for wheat and
a cost of wheat storage function are developed. Wheat spot and
futures markets were simulated using Monte Carlo techniques.
A new theoretical model of market determinations of wheat
equilibrium is calculated from empirically estimated parameters
as a function of harvest forecasts.
These advances in the state of the art of measuring'the
value of improved information make it possible, for the first
time, to authoritatively determine the value of ERS information
to the U.S. wheat economy.
This is done in this report. In doing so we went
substantially beyond the normal requirements of performance.
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ABSTRACT
This report describes the results of an investigation of
the value of improving information for forecasting future crop
harvests. The study is part of a larger effort to evaluate an
information gathering system based on remote sensing using satellites
orbiting the earth. However, the theory and measurement methods de-
veloped in this study are not dependent upon the detailed features
of the information system. Primary emphasis has been placed upon
establishing practical evaluation procedures of general applicability,
firmly based in economic theory. The first five sections of the
study are devoted to this. We believe the greater part of the theory
developed is new.
Since practical applicability was an important criterion
guiding our work we devoted the greater part of our effort, in terms
of time at least, to implementing the analysis for the case of U.S.
domestic wheat comsumption. This involved new estimates of a demand
function for wheat and of a cost of storage function. As far as we
know these represent a very significant improvement, in terms of eco-
nometric techniques upon studies available in the literature.
Another important component of the implementation effort was
a Monte Carlo simulation of the wheat spot and futures markets.
Since inventory adjustment is the point at which information is used
in the analysis, it was necessary to have a model of market determi-
nations of wheat inventories. Market equilibrium could be calculated
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from the empirically estimated parameters as a function of fore-
cast harvests only if the carry-over horizon is known. That is
the date in the future at which it is expected that the inventories
of the grain in question will be completely depleted, normally the
point at which the flow of newly harvested grain is beginning to
swell in June. In our theoretical analysis we showed how this
horizon could be determined by the solution to a certain non-linear
programming problem, the parameters of which include the forecast
harvest levels, which are random variables. To obtain the dis-
tribution of carry-over horizons from postulated distribution of
forecasts by analytic methods is not feasible, and hence the operation
of the wheat market was simulated, computing the carry-over horizon
as well as such related variables as spot and futures price at each
stage. The model is easily adaptable to other markets. We are not
aware of any similar study in the literature.
The empirical pieces of the study are put together in
section 6. The results are shown to depend critically on the
accuracy of current and proposed measurement techniques. Surpris-
ingly, these pieces of information were not readily available.
While it may be that further search of government agency sources
will fill this gap, the quantitative results at this stage are
best presented parametrically, in terms of various possible values
of current and future accuracies.
"Accuracy" can be described by a 95% confidence interval.
Accuracy in measurement of such variables as acres planted in a crop
translates into accuracy of the forecast relative to what it would
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be if the planted acreage were known perfectly. The following
table given in column (2) the estimated loss to the economy
associated with a 95% confidence interval about the "true
forecast" of annual wheat harvest, measured as plus or minus the
percentage in column (1):
Annual Loss to the Economy due to Measurement Error
(1) (2)
95 Confidence Interval Annual Loss in Millions
for Annual Crop Measurement of 1973 dollars
Error
+ 1% 3.4
+ 2 13.6
+ 3 30.7
+ 4 54.5
+ 5 85.2
+ 6 122.6
+ 7 166.9
Note that the confidence interval in column (1) of the
table should not be equated with two standard deviations of
forecast error, since the latter is a compoufd of measurement
error and variability due to weather, pests, etc. While statistics
are plentiful on crop forecast error, data on measurement error
have proved elusive. One bit of evidence did seem to refer to the
desired quantity, placing the "average smaple error" at 2.1%. If
we interpret + 1.96 times 2.1 as the boundaries of the 95% confid-
ence interval we obtain as estimated annual loss of 15.02 million
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dollars (3rd quarter 1973 dollars). Cutting this error in half
would * generate a gain equivalent to 11.4 million dollars per
year. The value of reducing the measurement error as promised
by an ERS space system, -and its sensitivity to changes in critical
paramters is shown in Table 1.1.
It is emphasized in the study that the results of the
model are illustrative only since the loss estimates are sensitvie
to the measurement error, for which no adequate estimate is avail-
able. The parametric approach to using the model in relation
to measurement error assumptions is therefore recommended.
The theoretical model developed in the study makes it
possible, as well, to calculate the value of increased speed of
availability of information. Obtaining information with a
shorter lag is tantamount to obtaining more accurate information,
since the naturally occurring random events introduce a discre-
pancy between past values of variables composing a forecast and
the present values upon which the theoretically ideal forecast
would be based. Preliminary work suggests that for the case of
wheat, reducing this lag by one month may be worth as much to
the economy as eliminating all measurement error without reduc-
ing the lag. While the calculation procedures have been worked
out, however, as of the time of submission the required program-
ming had not been completed to apply them.
* D.B. Wood, et. al., "The Use of the Earth Resources
Technology Satellite (ERTS) For Crop Production Forecasts",
Draft of Final Report, Goddard Space Flight Center,
July 24, 1974
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Table 1.1 The Value of Reducing Measurement Error Based .on
Goddard Task Force Results on ERTS and Earth Sat
(Millions of 4th qtr 1973 dollars annually)
Price Elasticity d for The Measurement Error at Completed
Wheat Demand Harvest (Annual)
2.2% c  2.5% a  3.3% a  4.4% c
(Winter Wheat) (Spring Wheat
-. 10 a 62.4 80.6 140.5 249.8
-. 50 b 12.5 16.1 28.1 50.0
aThis value was quoted in the Earth Sat case study
on agriculture
The basic estimate used in this report
Goddard Task Force Results on ERTS
dBased on United States domestic use of all wheat
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In this report we develop the theory necessary to
evaluate improvements in the measuring system used to
produce grain crop harvest forecasts. Crop forecasts are
used by a variety of agents in an economy for consumption
and production planning. We singled out two classes of
agents of particular importance: farmers (in their planting
decisions process) and inventory holders (in determining how
much to hold). Of these, in turn, we argue the uses of
better information by the second group are likely to generate
the larger share of benefits. In addition, it turns out
that the way in which a theory of inventory determination
leads to a value of information is somewhat simpler than
that required to incorporate producer decisions. Accordingly,
deciding in favor a greater depth of analysis over greater
breadth at this point, we decided to consider only the
benefits derived from improved inventory decisions.
This is not the same thing as considering only
benefits to inventory holders. Quite the contrary is the
case of the economic system we study most closely, the com-
petitive market system. The tendency of competition to
eliminate super-normal profits causes the benefits of im-
proved information to be transmitted to those selling to and
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buying from inventory holders, namely farmers and consumers of
wheat.
Actually, very little grain can be said to be
consumed "directly", since milling and baking are necessary
to produce bread, breakfast cereal, noodles, etc. The use
of grain as an input to some further production process is
considered to be "consumption", as distinguished from storage.
Since the demanders of wheat from the inventory system in-
clude such producers, some of what we label "consumption
benefits" will actually occur in the form of increased pro-
ducers' surpluses (rents), although, again, in a market
system competition tends to lead to a further passing along
of such gains to ultimate consumers.
The "objective" form of the benefits derivable from
better information is taken to be a smoothing of the flow
of consumption. (In a market system this corresponds to
more stable prices.) The value attributable to reduced
variability of the grain consumption flow dervies from the
pehnomenon of diminishing marginal valuation, the tendency
for increments of a good to be more highly valued when
little is available, and less highly valued when a great
deal is available.
Although there is a world grain market, and our
theorectical model applies as well to that system as to a
2
single national market, in applying our analysis we chose
to confine attention to the benefits generated for. U.S.
residents arising from improvements in forecasting U.S.
harvests of wheat. (Note that one could sensibly consider
the benefits generated for world residents from better fore-
casting of U.S. wheat harvests, or benefits for U.S. residents
from better forecasting of world wheat harvests. The same
methods apply, although different econometric problems would
be encountered.) The concentration on the United States was
influenced in part by the obvious concern U.S. policymakers
will have for benefits within the country, and in part by
the availability of reasonably good data with which to
estimate crucial parameters for this system.
For similar reasons, our modelling effort is.
directed at inventory determination in a market system. Crop
forecasts are, obviously, produced and used in economies
organized in other ways. Indeed, the active intervention
of the U.S. government in the domestic market system means
that even in the United States the market model has not been
the appropriate one for many periods. However, at present
the competitive market mechanism dominates the determination
of grain inventories in the United States. This is fortunate,
since modeling the political determination of inventories
poses more difficult problems.
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Section-by-Section Summary
The layman understands well that information can be
valuable, but that the value to one agent may be at the 
cost
of value to another. The football defense based on a knowledge
of the other team's signals is sure to be a good one, but
that gain due to better information comes at the expense 
of
the offense. On the other hand, some information, 
such as
the timing of the crest of a flood, is clearly of general
social value. In section 1 of the report we present 
an
informal discussion of the value of more accurate 
crop fore-
casts, attempting to isolate the concepts which we subsequently
incorporateto the formal model.
The "better" information obtained by advanced
technology methods is not itself in the form of 
better fore-
casts. The remote sensing devices and associated 
information
processing systems produce improved accuracy 
of measurement
of such phenomena as planted acreage, crop growth rates, etc.
This information is used to produce forecasts by incorpora-
tion into a forecasting model. There is a tendency to equate
shortcomings of forecasts with shortcomings of information,
but the first may arise through bad forecasting 
models and
through the sheer randomness of events occurring through
the time between forecast and outcome. Section 
2 describes
the model of crop forecasting used in this study. 
The notion
of "ideal forecast" at a point in time is introduced. 
This
is the forecast which could be constructed on the 
basis of
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perfect information about the things which are knowable at
that time. The measurement error component of a forecast
is assumed to arise from imperfect perception of ideal fore-
casts. Measurement improvements result in better estimates
of ideal forecasts.
Information may be improved in another way as well,
by reducing the lag between the date of measurement and the
availability of the resulting information in the form of a
forecast. The framework.established in section 2 makes it
easy to keep track of this aspect of information quality,
which seems likely to be an important one in the application
to satellite systems.
In section 3 we show the way in which better
information converted into improved forecasts can lead to
improved inventory decisions. The important point is
established that the value of information depends upon the
rule or procedure by which it is built into decisions.
If the use of information is not appropriate, "improved"
information may be valueless. Using a one-person, Robinson
Crusoe world, we develop a measure of the value of information
and a theory of Crusoe's incroporation of information to his
inventory decision.
Crusoe is modeled as solving an optimization problem.
With only minor modification, the general form of his
problem can be used to describe that of inventory determination
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in a market system. Whereas we could simply assume an
objective function for Crusoe depending upon his monthly gain
consumption, it is necessary to derive a social objective
function. We use the area under the demand curve to represent
the dollar value of any specified quantity of grain consumed.
The benefits of an improved information system are taken to
be measured by the expected value of annual grain consump-
tion (by month) less storage costs. This is set out in
section 4.
While Crusoe's inventory decision could be derived
from his optimizing behavior, the rule by which forecasts
influence inventories in a market system must be determined
from the profit-maximizing behavior of many competitive
inventory holders. The profits of competitive inventory holders
occur in the form of the capital gains on their stocks. If the
increased in price from period to period is large enough to
compensate for storage and interest costs they hold addition
inventories. If the price increase expected is too little,
inventory holders sell off their stocks. The price is
determined by the amount made available to consumers, which
is the sum of heldover inventories and current-period harvests,
less inventories carred forward. Thus, in order to predict
prices, inventory holders must predict their own future
decisions. In section 5 the way in which this system can
be closed is derived. Along the way, futures markets are
6
introduced to coordinate the expectations of inventory
holders as a group.
By the end of section 5 we have a full theory of
the relationship between information as translated into
forecasts and competitive inventories. Section 6 puts all
of the pieces together in an empirical application, calcu-
lating the value of improved information in the case of the
U.S. wheat market. We adduce functional forms and para-
meters to the key relationships of the model, and carry out
the calculations. Most of the required parameters can be
estimated with reasonable confidence. An exception is the
current and prospective degree of accuracy of measurement
systems. The final estimated results are therefore presented
in parametric form. For those interested simply in the
numerical results, Figure 6.1 and 6.2 shows our best estimate of
the value of introducing an ERS space system based on the Task
Force Report results on ERS.* On the basis of that evidence,
we can guess that the current levels of accuracy allow us to
come within plus or minus 7.6% of the ideal monthly forecast har-
vest for any month about 95% of the time. If we reduce this confi-
dence interval to plus or minus 3.8%, the estimated gain to the
economy is equivalent to 11',4 million (4th qts. 1973) dollars
per year.
* D. B. Wood, et. al., "The Use of the Earth Resources Technology
Satellite (ERTS) for Crop Production Forecasts", Draft Final
Report, Goddard Space Flight Center, July 24, 1974.
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Table 6.5 indicates how this particular measurement
improvement would be affected by various changes in the
underlying parameters. Although the range noted there is
large, this is the result of including for comparison purposes
a parameter value used in other studies, that of the elas-
ticity of demand, which we have replaced by new econometric
work. In fact, our estimates of demand elasticities appear
.to be a great improvement upon those available in the litera-
ture, and they seem to be robust to changes in the specifi-
cation of the demand model. Hence one can with some confidence
place the gain from the specified information improvement
in the range of values shown in Table 6.5.
While we feel some confience in the numerical results
presented by section 6, it should be kept in mind that our
major objective was to produce evaluation procedures of.
general applicability, firmly based on economic theory. The
main "product" of the study is the procedures themselves.
Parametrically, these are best demonstrated by a graph of economic
loss caused by wrong inventory decision against measurement error
as in Figure 6.2.
Section 7 presents suggestions for further work
in the contest of a review of the main links in the chain of
8
reasoning. In fact,: the very last subsection of the main
text contains a summary of the model which may be profitably
read as introductory material.
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1. Informal Discussion of the Value of Accurate Forecasts
The subject of the value of information is a broad
one and it will be useful to keep in min that the information
of which we speak concerns the current value of certain
measurable quantities. The devices under consideration are
expected to provide accurate information about the current
status of different agricultural crops, which will enable us
to predict with greater accuracy than with current methods
the quantity of those crops which will emerge from the farm at
specified times in the future. Information of this kind may be
distinguished at least for practical purposes from information
about new technologies, which in principle might never be
revealed at all.
A forecast of the future is expressable, explicitly
or implicitly in the form of a probability distribution.
Such a distribution may be though of as representing the
degree of certainty of a person's beliefs about the future.
For example, we may say of the particular day July 4, 1974,
that it will rain on that day with probability .3 and it
will not rain with probability .7. As the day comes closer
it may become possible to dicover by meteorological analysis
that July 1974 is going to be a particularly rainy month and
therefore we revise our estimate, increasing in our minds the
probability of rain. At one minute to midnight of July 3, 1974
we may be able to state with a very high degree of con-
difence whether it is going to rain or not, in which case our
10
belief would be expressed in the form of a probability 1 of
that event which we by that time consider most likely.
Of course, a forecast is usually summarized by a single
number: the wheat harvest forecast for the year 1975 will be
a number such as 2,000 million bushels. This number is the
mean of the distribution of harvests characterizing the belief
of the person making the forecast. Equivalently, we may think
of the beliefs as characterized by this number plus a distri-
bution of errors, the various deviations between the 2,000
bushels forecast and what the forecaster anticipates will
actually occur. Corresponding to this subjective distribution
is an observable (in principle) distribution of deviations
between the forecast and what is known to have occurred after
the fact. These observable quantities are what are normally
referred to as "forecast error." We note that the subjective
distribution is the one relevant for decision-making. For
the most part we shall use the term forecast error to refer to
both concepts, referring to the distinction only where con-
fusion may otherwise result. We shall assume that such
distributions are completely determined by specification of
mean and variance; sometimes we shall treat them as Gaussian
normal.
Forecasting error variance expresses our degree of
uncertainty, which may arise from two sorts of sources. First,
we may not have a very good idea of what the state of the world
11
is now or has been in the past. For example, we may have
only a crude thermometer available to assist us to forecast
the afternoon temperature. Second, there may be events which
are genuinely random, or may be treated as such, which will
occur between now and the time point to which our forecast is
directed, which make it impossible for us to know the future
with certainty, no matter how- clear our picture of the present
state of affairs: no matter how accurate our knowledge of
the starting point of the roulette ball, we may not be able
to narrow the forecast error on its ultimate stopping point.
(The example illustrates the ambiguity of the distinction.
Presumably if we really understood the roulette wheel and
could calculate well enough, we could improve our forecast.)
The "information" we shall be discussing here is directed
toward reducing the variance due to the first source. Improved
information allows us to make more accurate forecasts, expres-
sable as a reduction in the dispersion of our subjective
distribution of forecast quantities before the fact and, cor-
respondingly, a reduction in the dispersion of the experienced
forecast error (deviation between forecast and actual quantities)
after the fact. Such a reduction might be achieved by obtaining
from the farmer precise information about the amount of wheat
he plans to plant in June 1974. While, before the harvest,
the uncertainty about the outcome resulting from weather
variability remains, the information about the planting allows
12
us to construct a guess about the resulting outcome in
September which is more accurate than the guess in the absence
of the information. The degree to which our estimate is im-
proved can be expressed by a reduction in the variance of the
subjective distribution and of the forecast errors.
The value of information thus depends upon the value
of good forecasts. In the remainder of this section we discuss
in an informal way why forecasts are valuable, and to whom.
This will form the basis for our subsequent formal theory and
measurement.
The Meaning of the Value of Forecasts
When we speak of the value of forecasts we must
distinguish carefully between value to the entire economy and
the value to a single individual. 'As is well known, it is
often possible for an individual to reap large gains from a
possession of knowledge of great accuracy or at least pos-
session of knowledge of greater accuracy than that possessed
by others. We may illustrate this by the example of a price
prediction, let us say of a painting by Rembrandt which is to
come up at auction in September 1974, and which is now on the
market for purchase in January 1974. Knowing exactly what the
Rembrandt will sell for 8 months hence, I can make a certain
decision now what price it is worth paying. The accurate
13
forecast of the future allows me to make with certainty a
gain now. Note, however, that should the information lead
me to decide to buy the painting now, in January, the effect
is to shift to me the profit obtained by the difference between
the selling price now and that 8 months hence, but at the cost
of an equivalent gain in the hand of someone else who might
have purchased the painting if I did not. The opportunity
would obviously have been lost to me were the information I
possessed about the price to rule in September available
generally instead of available to me alone.
In this illustrative case we see that the sole effect
of improved information in the hands of a single individual
is to alter the incidence of a gain from one person to another.
Presumably the ultimate purchaser of the Rembrandt in September
would have ended up holding the painting in any case, and the
only effect .of improved information is to place the gain in
my hands rather than in someone else's hands. It is usual in
applied welfare economics, although not always justifiable,
to equate equivalent dollar amounts of gains by one person
It would be desirable to have different terms for
the various meanings of the word "information" occuring in
this study. Strictly speaking, we intend the word to refer to
an estimate of some observable quantity, such as the number of
acres planted in wheat. In this sense, a forecast is not
"information", at least given the current development of normal
human perceptions. It seems rather pedantic, however, to en-
force this distinction throughout the text, and we believe no
confusion will result from our usage.
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With the same amount of gains by someone else. In this case
we would say that there has been a private gain to me offset
by an equivalent loss to someone else from the improved in-
formation about the price of the Rembrandt in September 1974.
Although there have been possilby large changes in private
wealth as a result of this information we would say, loosely
speaking, there is no social gain whatsoever.
This distinction between private gain and social gain
may be even more dramatically illustrated by pointing out the
possible advantage to an individual of misinformation in the
hands of others. Thus, if I wish to purchase a piece of
property it may be greatly to my advantage that everyone else
in the world thinks it highly likely that a major highway is
going to be built across that property, even though I know
with certainty that this is not the case. Even though the mis-
information may lead other people to make bad allocative choices,
I stand potentially to make a substantial gain. Again the
crucial point for estimating private gain is the degree of
inequality or asymmetry of information in the hands of different
agents. In this illustrative case it should be clear that there
is no social gain in the usual sense to be had from the promulga-
tion of misinformation, even though this might be greatly to one
individual's private advantage.
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Sources of Social Gain from Improved Forecasts
There are two broad sorts of social gain from a general
reduction in crop forecasting error. First, by virtue of good
forecasts of forthcoming corps a society is able to make im-
proved allocative decisions. Both by making better timed
dispositions of -inventories of available farm products, and
by making planting decisions in better anticipation of the total
crop harvest, the society can optimize the flow of consumption
over time. The underlying idea is that it is desirable to
have a smooth flow of consumption of commodities, rather than
an irregular one. This is the familiar principle that the
value of increments to consumption of a good decreases as the
quantity consumed increases: The value of. an additional bushel
of tomatoes in the presence of a large crop in August is much
smaller than the value of an increment of a bushel in the
middle of winter when few tomatoes are available.
Secondly, a reduction in the dispersion of the
subjective distribution of forecast errors, i.e., an increase
in the degree of certainty, may be valued in itself. We cus-
tomarily assume that economic agents prefer a certain outcome
to situations in which the average of expected outcome is the
same but with some variance. It is this value which is
referred to when we speak of individuals having risk aversion,
the prevalence of which is suggested by such phenomena as
insurance and portfolio diversification.
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In this study we consider only the gain of the first
sort, that arising from our ability to make decisions which
are less likely after the fact to have proved incorrect. The
value of reduced uncertainty per se will be ignored. In the
context of the models of behavior of agents in markets under
uncertainty which follow, the assumption that uncertainty per se
is not a source of loss of value will be reflected in the
assumption that agents act to maximize expected monetary
profits.
This Study Concentrates on Inventory Adjustment Gains
Within the class of allocative gains we shall further
restrict our attention to those resulting from improved in-
ventory choices. There are two reasons for this. The first
is that in the case of wheat, the crop to which our analysis
will be applied empirically, the possibility for significantly
adjusting production within the crop year appears limited.
This means that we are guessing that the size of the gain from
this source is small relative to that available from the in-
ventory improvements. It would, no doubt, be most desirable
to test this guess by carrying out the analysis and measurements,
which brings us to the second reason for starting with a con-
centration on inventories. As we shall see in the succeeding
sections, the analysis of this problem is simpler than that
of the case of endogenous supply decisions. Since the chain
17
of reasoning and calculations we shall be tracing is already
rather long, there is a great advantage in resisting the
further complication. At the same time, while our expectation
was fulfilled that it is possible to obtain highly convincing
econometric estimates of demand parameters, there is every
reason to expect great difficulty in estimating supply para-
meters. Thus, both reasons of theoretical complexity and
estimation problems reinforce our preference on ground of
expected relative potential gain for considering the pure
inventory adjustment model.
The Distribution of Gains from Improved Information
It may be thought that the gainers and losers from
the production of new and better information are affected by
the way in which the new information is introducted into the
system, and this indeed appears to be the case. As the example
of the Rembrandt auction suggests, particular agents to whom new
information is first communicated may be able to reap large
personal benefits at the cost of benefits to others. The
importance of dissemination procedures is well recognized in,
for example, the regulation of "insiders" in security markets.
An example might be made of a discovery by a cooperation
of large deposits of some mineral. This discovery will be
reported to the general public on a specified data in the future;
in the meantime it is of extraordinary value to an insider who
18
may be able to capture enormous speculative gains, much as
our Rembrandt purchaser was able to in the earlier illustra-
tion. By the same token it is clear that it is possible to
introduce information in some ways which is actually harmful
to individuals, at least in the ex post sense. In this case,
for example, the individual who sells his stock in the company
which has discovered the large mineral deposit will certainly
after the fact be less well off than he would have been had
all of the information become available on the date in the
future when it was to be made generally public.
Of course even information in the hands of a stock
market insider is transmitted at least partially to the
general public via the very process by which that individual
capitalizes on his advantage, in this case through the resulting
increase in the price of the stock of the corporation in ques-
tion due to his purchases. In this way information in the
hands of the insider is related to decisions of other people
by their observation of the market price of the stock.
Similarly in the case of improved forecasting, the
potential speculative gains accruing to individuals in
possession of improved information are obvious distributional
consequences; since these gains must be balanced by losses
of those who do not have access to the improved crop informa-
tion, the result is shifting gains from one group to another.
Here too, no matter where it is initially introduced, the
information would in part be made available to the general
19
public, at least in its crucial aspects, via the movements
in price which would be generated by its possession in a single
individual's hands. Just as in the case of the Rembrandt
painting, however, the speculative gains may be entirely offset
by speculative losses and the net social benefit might
be zero or very small. The implications for social policy of
the precise method releasing information therefore appear nontrivial.
At the opposite pole from the stock market insider
archetype is the government statistical information made
available in a carefully controlled way to an entire group
of people at once. The ideal picture of this sort of informa-
tion release is a report on our corporation with the large
new mineral deposit appearing for the first time in a Sunday
newspaper on which day the market in which the company's
stock is traded is closed. Now we have no price changes
occuring during a period in which information is asymmetri-
cally distributed. Rather, the market opens on Monday morning
with all of the agents in possession of the same new knowledge
Who gains and who loses? Paradoxically, in ex post facto
sense, it would appear that there do exist possible losers
from introduction of better information. Let us suppose, for
example, that the information is an increase in the forthcoming
supply of some crop. As a holder of the stock of this commodity
I had planned on Monday morning to sell my entire inventory
on the market. The new information will cause the market
price of this commodity to decline and I will therefore have
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been made worse off by its introduction. Again, for every
such loser there is a corresponding gainer, and it is dif-
ficult to make a strong case for a particular distribution
of such gains and losses without going into considerable
greater detail along normative lines. There seems to be some
normative advantage to reducing gains and losses attri-
butable to asymmetrical information, but it is not entirely
clear that this is well grounded.
If we consider a more prior sense of gains and losses,
and imagine that we can all choose whether the government
should make available at some date in the future a particular
report about forthcoming crops, we expect intuitively a
preference for the system where. this report is made. (Counter
cases could be constructed, however.) On the other hand, if
we imagine that the crop information is going to be made
available to an insider, it is not at all hard to imagine our
wishing rather that the information not be made available at
all. It might be fruitful to examine in greater detail the
difference between these two cases.
There is one important group of people who would be
averse to the government's introducing a new statistical
service, for example, and these are the people now engaged in
producing information and marketing it. Obviously such in-
formation producers are potentially hurt by the introduction
of a new information source.
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2. The Model of Forecasting Used in This Study
The construction of a forecast involves two main
elements: information about what is the current status of
various features of the world and a model of how the currently
observable features influence the variable being forecast.
Suppose, to pose an illustrative example, we are interested
in knowing into which of seven holes a pinball will roll at
the end of its run down an inclined plane studded with the
usual obstacles. Let us consider how a forecast is constructed.
We start with a model of how the ball will roll
starting from a given point with a given velocity. This model
consists of the laws of motion and of knowledge about the
positions and physical characteristics of the obstacles, by
which it is possible to compute the path of the ball. Typi-
cally there will be unknown or imperfectly known elements of
the physical system. Furthermore shocks may be anticipated
from outside of the system which will influence the path of
the ball; the pinball machine may be located just above a
subway tunnel. As a result, even if we know the starting
point, our physical model of the system does not generally
allow us to predict exactly the path of the ball. We might
typically express our forecast of the final location of the
ball in the form of a single number (e.g., "hole number 3 "),
but this normally is simply the central tendency of an implied
probability distribution.
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If we have precise knowledge of the position, direction of
motion, velocity of the ball at a given point in time we can
predict its position at any later time using this physical model,
which is what we referred to above as a model of how the
currently observable features (position, direction and velocity)
influence the variable (future position of the ball) being forecast.
Because of what may be regarded as truly random aspects of the
system within which the ball is moving, our forecast must
be itself in the form of a probability distribution, even
though we may express it in the form of a single number.
Furthermore, because of the cumulative nature of the random
shocks through time, the dispersion of our forecast distribu-
tion of the positions of the ball is likely to increase as
the distance into the future over which we are attempting to
forecast increases. In looser and more commonplace language,
long-term forecasts are "less accurate" than short-term fore-
casts owingto the greater intervention of random influences.
As was suggested above, there is in addition to nature's
randomness, another source of "inaccuracy" of forecasts,
associated with inadequacy of information about the current
state of the system, in this case the current position and
velocity of the ball. Let us suppose, for example, that these
are obtained by the observer using a ruler on top of the glass
cover of the pin-ball run and a stop watch. Assuming that the
observer is capable of instantaneous calculation of the forecast
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once he is given position and velocity, he can convert his
observation of these variables into a prediction at once.
However, the procedure for obtaining position and velocity
is itself subject to error, which we shall refer to as
sampling error or measurement error. Measurement error would
cause forecasts to be random variables, with some degree of
dispersion, even if the model of the system were perfect and
the system itself not subject to outside shocks. The dis-
persion or inaccuracy of actual forecasts is thus a compound
of nature's randomness and measurement error.
This study is primarily concerned with the value of
reducing the measurement error in the construction of crop
forecasts. It is clear that this is only a part of the source
of dispersion in crop forecasts. However, even though varia-
bility due to nature's randomness is great, and there is
correspondingly a large potential for improving forecasts by
improvements in the model of the crop production system (e.g.,
by deeper understanding of the determinants of weather), we
shall see that relatively small measurement errors are sur-
prisingly costly. As a result there are substantial gains
to be made by improving the information about the current
state of the system, i.e., by reducing the measurement error.
There is a further way in which information can be
improved. This is the reduction in time between the obser-
vation or measurement of the state of the system and the
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availability of the information for use in the form of
a forecast. Such a reduction seems particularly likely in
shifting from methods of sampling involving postal or tele-
phonic communication of observations to a central calculating
unit -- as when field units report to the U.S.D.A. -- by an
advanced technology method based on satellite observation,
in which information is handled electronically as a matter
of course at every stage.
We refer to the time elapsed between the actual
observation of the state of the system and the production
and transmission of a useful forecast based on that informa-
tion as the availability lag associated with a forecasting
procedure. This may be illustrated with our'pinball machine.
Suppose that the initial procedure involves measurements,
using the ruler and stop-watch, which are then entered into
a mechanical calculating machine to produce a forecast of the
path of the ball. Because the calculations take time, by
the time a forecast has been made the ball is no longer
at the point on which the forecast is based. The forecast,
in other words, is constructed on data about the ball at
some time in the past. The longer is the lag'the less
useful is the forecast for two reasons. First, the longer
the time which has elapsed, the less useful is the historical
position and velocity of the ball as a predictor of its current
position, because the ball has in the meantime been subject to
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nature's random shocks. Second, the longer is the delay, the
less remains of the ball's path to be predicted. If the delay is
long enough, the forecast arrives after the ball has already
reached the end of its run! The forecast is then of use only
in checking the adequacy of the model of the system. It arrives
too late to help the person wanting to place a bet on the
final position of the ball.
The two aspectes of improving the information base for
forecasting are thus interrelated. The shorter is the avail-
bility lag the more valuable is any given reduction in
measurement error.
A rough analogy exists between the pinball forecast-
ing problem and the idealized version of crop forecasting
used in this paper. We take time to be broken into discrete
months. The problem of crop-forecasting is not to follow
a single ball through time but rather several balls in the form
of monthly harvests. Let Gt (sometimes we shall write this
equivalently as G(t)) denote the quantity of the grain of
interest harvested during month t. This notation will be
used throughout, although later, when exports are introduced
we shall let Gt stand for "effective harvest", or actual
harvest less exports.
It is assumed that, on the basis of perfect information
about conditions on the ground, numbers of acres planted in
the specified grain in each of several geographical regions,
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visible condition of ripeness, etc,, forecasts can be con-
structed of the quantities to be harvested for each of a
certain succession of coming months, using a model of how
grains evolve over time as they mature. Such forecasts are
subject to error due to nature's randomness. We speak of this
set of ideal forecasts, which would be made in a given month
on the basis of perfect information about what is in principle
knowable in that month, as the state of the system. The state
of the system as of period t is denoted by St . St is a
t+l
vector of ideal forecasts; its first component is S , a
forecast of Gt+1 , etc;:
t t+1. t+M+1(2.1) St (S tSt , ... St ).
Note that the superscript which identifies a component of St
identifies the period for which an ideal forecast is being
made.
Actual forecasts of crops are based not upon perfect
information but upon measurements and samples of such quantities
as acres under cultivation, height of stalks, etc. These
are subject to sampling or measurement error. When the data
are fed into the model which produces forecasts, these errors
result in deviations between the actual set of forecasts of
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9monthly harvests and the ideal set of forecasts represented
by St . Great simplification in our analysis is effected
by regarding St itself as the object of measurement.
It is important to be clear about this device. When
we speak of sampling or measurement error, we refer to an
error of measurement of St , not directly to the underlying
errors of measurement of acreage, growth, etc. Since such
underlying errors translate directly into errors in estimation
of St this analytical convenience does not affect the
generality of the results. However, some caution must be
exercised when we come to specification of a probability dis-
tribution of percentage errors in measurement of -St , a
distribution which need not be identical to that of percentage
errors in any of the components from which forecasts are
calculated.
A forecast based on month t information then, is
here taken to be an estimate of St . Denote by St such an
estimate. We shall assume that the measuring devices and
procedures introduce an error t such that
(2.2) St = St + Pt
28
The measurement error, t ' is thus a vector, with components
t t+l t+M+1
(9 t '"'t "
At this point we should explain the meaning of the
parameter M which occurs in the specification of St . We
refer to this parameter as the "maturation period", a name
motivated by a simple model, whereby the grain harvested in
any period must have been planted exactly M periods earlier.
If we take the quantity planted as exogenously given, not
endogenously determined, in this model it is not possible to
forecast the harvest of any month more than M periods into
the future on the basis of currently observable features of
the system. Of course one may construct a forecast from
prior knowledge of, say, the typical periodic pattern of
harvests, but this is not dependent upon an input of current
information.
In fact, this simple model is only a very rough
approximation to the case of wheat, the grain to which our
analysis will be applied in this study. The number of months-
between planting and harvesting varies greatly with the type
of wheat and the region of the country in which it is planted.
There is no reason one could not take this into account in the
model, for example, allowing M to be itself a function of t.
Rather than carry along this complication, however, we have chosen
to work with a constant M, It can -in.any case always be
interpreted as the maximum number of months into the future
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one can forecast harvests, with the forecast depending upon
features at least in principle currently observable.
Under this interpretation we see that the last
t+M+1
component of the measurement error vector in (2.2) qt
will be identically zero. This is so because by definition
of M the forecast of Gt+M+1  cannot depend upon features
observable at time t
We have very nearly completed the description of the
model of forecasting. It remains to put the availability
lag back into the story. Let the symbol AL stand for
A
availability lag. Then StAL is the vector of forecasts
available at time t . To be more precise, the components
of St-AL referring to harvests occurring at or beyond month t
are taken to be the forecasts available at time t . Thus,
26for example, S26 would be the forecast of G2 6  available23 26
in month 25 if the availability lag were 2
3. A Model of the Social Gain from Improved Forecasting
It may seem obvious that more accurate and more
timely information is valuable. Oddly enough this is not
necessarily so. Suppose, for example it happens that a cer-
tain curative procedure followed by a physician to treat some
malady is exactly wrong -- it greatly amplifies the effects
of the sickness. Because it is virtually impossible to
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diagonose this malady in a timely way, however, the treatment
is almost never used. An improvement in fhe information
system which produced an earlier and more accurate diagnosis
will be of negative value, since the use of the information
is incorrect. This simple illustration suggests how important
it is, in attempting to evaluate improvements in crop fore-
casting information, to develop a satisfactory model of the
way in which information is used.
For the various reasons indicated in Section i, it
may actually be easier to determine social value of
information than its valu e in the hands of an individual
who stands to gain from an asymmetrical information advantage.
In this section we attempt to-make precise some of the concepts
involved in estimating the social gain. It is important at
the outset to spell out as clearly as possible the basic ideas,
and for this reason we start by confining our attention to a
one-man society, a Robinson Crusoe world. We consider Crusoe's
inventory problem, the problem of allocating given (but im-
perfectly foreeable) harvests to consumption over time.
Crusoe's problem will be constructed in such a way
as to guarantee that better information is valuable. This
will follow from the fact that Crusoe is explicitly attempting
to optimize his grain consumption sequence, and his rules for
using information are designed to contribute to this end.
When we turn in the following section to the model of the use
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of information in a market system we shall not have any
obvious assurance that the rules by which agents in markets
use information tend to be optimal from a social point of
view. Thus, while there is a close analogy between the Crusoe
world and a world of many agents operating in markets, there is
this important difference in character between the source of the
rules for using information. While it is likely that, as in many
similar welfare economic models, market behavior has optimality
properties, we shall not demonstrate these in this case, and
whether information has positive value will have to be
determined from empirical data.
Having sketched out the importance of modelling the
rules of information usage and flagged the difference between
the Crusoe model and the market model, let us turn to Crusoe's
proble. We take Crusoe's only interest to be the consumption
of two goods, an agricultural commodity, which we shall call
"grain" and measure in tons, and some sort of composite of
other commodities and services, which we shall call "numeraire
good" and measure in real dollars (or simply "dollars" as
long as we need not be concerned with price inflation).
Assume finally that Crusoe values any given amount (x) of
grain consumption in one month as exactly equivalent to an extra
V(x) dollars of consumption of numeraire good in that month:
take away from Crusoe his x units of grain consumption in a
month and substitue V(x) dollars of numeraire good consumption
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and he will declare himself just satisfied with the switch.
The amount of grain consumed by Crusoe in each period
depends upon the amount harvested, the amount added to current
stocks, and the amount carried over from previous periods.
Further in making choices about production and storage plans,
Crusoe must take into account the numeraire good costs
incurred in producing and storing grain.
Let Qt be the quantity of grain placed into
inventory in period t to hold over until period t+l , and
let TC(Q t ) be the total dollar cost incurred in period t
to perform this storage. It seems reasonable to suppose that
a certain amount of grain is lost through deterioration in
storage, so let us assume that if Qt is stored in period
t then (1-6)-Q t  is actually carried forward to period
t+l, where 6 is some constant, presumably positive.
Recall that Gt stands for the output of grain from
the farms in month t . Since we shall not now consider
alternative plans for Gt we take it as exogenously given
and ignore its cost. We can now write down the amount of
grain consumed in period t as related to storage decisions
in period t-l and t :
(3.1) C = Gt + (1-6)Qt-i t
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Since Gt's are taken as given, a choice of a sequence of
inventory levels Qt determines a sequence of grain
consumption levels. (Of course, we cannot pick a negative
inventory level, since grain cannot be moved basckward
in time. Furthermore, if our sequence of inventory levels
is to be feasible it must not imply a negative grain con-
sumption level, _Ct , at any time.)
Associated with a feasible sequence of inventory
levels and a given sequence of grain harvests is a
sequence of numeraire good values of grain consumption,
from which we must net out costs of grain storage.
Substituting (3.1) into V(x) we can define the annual
dollar value of the consumption arising from a sequence
of inventories by
(3.2) V(Gt + (1-6)Qt -Qt)+ V(Gt+ + (1-6)Q t - Qt+l )
+ . . . + V(Gt+11 + (l-6)Qt+10 - Qt+ll )
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(Note again that this value is not defined for arbitrary
sequences Qt, Gt, since feasibility requires Qt > 0 and
Ct > 0.)
What we have accomplished thus far is to relate
Crusoe's well-being to what Nature does (in the form of the
Gt's) and to what Crusoe does (in the form of the Qt's). We
next consider how Crusoe picks the Qt s and how this connects
with crop forecasting.
We may presume that Crusoe makes his decision on
inventory holdings on the basis of guesses about grain harvests
in the future. The guesses could be completely arbitrary, but
more plausibly Crusoe makes his guesses about harvests on the
basis of some sort of model, explicit or implicit, of the
way the future is related to the present and the past. In
other words, he constructs forecasts. For example, if wheat
is harvested 180 days after sowing and Crusoe knows the amount
of 60 day old wheat in existence, he will forecast the wheat
harvest 120 days in the future by multiplying the amount of
60-day old wheat by a factor representing typical growth rates,
average losses due to insects, etc. Crusoe knows that his
forecast will never be completely correct, that there will be
some forecasting error, but if his guessing procedure is a
good one, he will be right on average. We shall assume that
Crusoe has at his disposal at time t an estimate, StAL
of the state of the system AL months earlier.
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At this point it is desirable to introduce an
assumption about the way Nature behaves in generating the
harvests which Crusoe is attempting to forecast. This assump-
tion, which will be carried in its essentials throughout the
subsequent analysis, is that Nature produces "years" of monthly
harvests according to a stationary stochastic process. A
"year", naturally enough, consists of twelve monthly harvests.
It is of no particular importance in which calendar month the
year is taken to begin, and we therefore adopt the natural
convention that month 1 is January, making month 12 December,
month 13 January, etc. Our stationarity assumption amounts
to saying that the probability distribution of January through
December harvests corresponding to a random choice of calendar
year is independent of the label on the year. Although this
rules out the obviously realistic feature of a trend in the annual
harvest this could easily be "tacked on" should the analysis
require this complication.
What this assumption means is that any rule Crusoe
might adopt for using crop information will lead in turn to
a.stationary stochastic process in twelve-month patterns of
consumption. If we further (a) abstract from the particular
starting point of Crusoe and (b) assume he is an expected money-
value maximizer (indifferent to risk per se) we can evaluate
alternative policies by computing the expected value,
for any choice of r, of:
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(3.3) r -+ 11
SV(C i)
i=r
with respect to the randomness due to nature and the randomness
due to the imperfect forecasting instrument. For convenience
we consider the expression for N = 1.
Let us consider now the nature of Crusoe's inventory
determination rule. It seems clear that his inventory decision
at any time must depend only upon how much grain he has held
over from the previous month, how much is harvested in the
current month, and the probability distribution of future
harvests. Let us assume that Crusoe's decision in fact depends
only upon the expected values of future harvests. Then the
inventory he chooses to hold over from month t to t+l
can be written as a function Rt of inherited inventory, Qt-1
and forecast harvests, Gt,Gt+l,Gt+ 2 ...
A A A
(3.4) Qt Rt(Qt-l'Gt, G ,Gt+2,
Furthermore, we know that forecast harvests are given by the
appropriate elements of the vector StAL for as far into
the future as that vector extends. Beyond that date'the
forecasts are the expected values of nature's stationary dis-
tribution of monthly harvests.
The twelve-month harvest sequence which is the
expected value of nature's distribution is sufficiently
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important to deserve a name, and we have called it the
standard harvest pattern, (GlG 2 ,...,G 1 2) . It will be
obvious that the last component S t+M+1 in the state of the
t
system vector, St , is the standard harvest for the corres-
ponding calendar month. We can therefore rewrite our rule
(3.4) as
A~t At+MAL(3.5) Qt = RtAL St-t - +M-AL
t t-l' t-AL**' t-AL
The assumptions made thus far assure us that there will be
at most 12 distinct rules RAL; that is, the sequence of
functions, ALRAL is periodic with period 12.
The form of rules (3.5) should not be taken to indicate
that the inventory held at the end of a month does not depend
upon the standard harvest pattern. Although those numbers do
not appear among the listed arguments, this is simply because,
for given t, the standard harvests always enter the calcula-
tions in exactly the same way. In fact, as we shall see when
we come to the case of a market system, obtaining explicit
expressions for rules (3.5) can be rather difficult in spite
of the basically very simple model of harvest generation used.
Corresponding to nature's stochastic process producing
the harvests there will be, via (3.5), a stochastic sequence
of inventories. This stochastic process will also be charac-
terized by a stationary distribution of twelve-month inventory
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sequences. That is, there will be a stationary joint
distribution of, say, the thirteen-month sequence of inven-
tories stretching from December through December and the
twelve harvests from January to December, independent of the
calendar year. Using accounting identities (3.1) we can
express Cl'...,C 12  in terms of thirteen inventories
Qo,..., 12 and twelve harvests G ,...,G 12 . Substituting
into expression (3.3) for the value of a twelve-month "piece"
of a consumption process, we are in a position to compute
the expected value of a nature's harvest process as trans-
lated into wheat consumption, given the information system
and Crusoe's rules (3.5) for using information. The value
of improving information is the amount by which expectation
(3.3) is increased when the measurement errors are reduced,
or the availability lag decreased.
To put these ideas into practice, it is necessary to
make assumptions about function form. To illustrate, assume
that V( ) is quadratic. It is a simple refinement to allow
V( ) itself to depend upon the calendar month in which the
consumption occurs. Accordingly, let Vt( ) be the valuation
function for month t, it being understood that the sequence of
functions Vt is periodic with period 12, and that all are
quadratic. Assume further, for convenience only, that rules
Rt are linear in their arguments.
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Making the substitution of expressions (3.5) into
objective function (3.3), and using the relationship (2.2)
between St and St , we have a quadratic expression in
variable St , determined by nature, and Yt, "determined"
as the random errors of measurement associated with our fore-
casting system. If we hold all the variables other than '
constant, this substitution gives us a quadratic expression
in the various errors of measurement. These errors are
assumed to have the usual properties of independence from
other variables in the system and of having an expected value
of zero.
Under these various assumptions, the grand expectation
of the objective function over nature's randomness and the
randomness of the measurement system, can be expressed as a
linear expression in first and second moments of nature's
distribution alone, plus a linear expression in the second
moments of the distribution of '. As long as we are concen-
trating on the value of changing the moments of Y by changing
the information system, the first expression can be ignored.
When we come to considering the value .of reducing the
availability lag, AL, we shall need to inquire further into nature's-
distribution. This is best postponed until analytically more
transparent evaluation of sample error reduction has been completed.
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Rather than pursue Crusoe's problem further, having
described the basic logic of the valuation of information,
we turn now to a market model of inventory determination.
In this model, society's decision rule analogous to R will
be the result of profit seeking choices of inventory holders.
We shall see that for "reasonable" specifications of the
model and of the associated valuation function the expected
value of the consumption stream is indeed a decreasing
function of the variances of the sampling errors. Thus,
if the market model is a reasonable approximation to the
behavioral rules followed in practice, the direct benefits
associated with a given level of sampling accuracy could be
estimated if the behavioral model is so estimated.
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4. The Social Value of Crop Forecasting Information in a
Competetive Market System: Theory
In the prbvious section we sketched out a theory of
the value of crop information in a one-man world. In this
section we show how the same idea extends to a world in which
grain is bought and sold in a marketplace and in which profit-
maximizing inventory holders perform the determination of the
amount of grain to be held from period to period. We con-
tinue to deal with a single commodity and to assume that th&
amount of grain harvested is entirely determined by Nature,
so that the social problem remains the optimal choice of
storage as before.
The principal ways in which markets enter the analysis
are in the construction of the objective function and in the
.theory of the connection between inventory levels chosen and
available information. Market prices are used in both prob-
lems. The markets which we introduce (besides the implicitly
present capital market) are the spot and futures markets for
grain.
The agents of our model are consumers of grain and
inventory holders. In addition, grain speculators are, or
may be, present. We shall assume that "consumers" are people
who do not store significant quantities of grain, but rather
use it up for current satisfaction or use it as--an input to
further production processes (e.g. in the form of cattle
feed). We let
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(4.1) Pt(X) = the demand curve for grain = the price at
which a quantity x of grain will be
demanded for consumption.
Note that the demand curve is itself a function of time;
we shall assume a different demand curve for each calendar
month.
We shall assume that pt(x) is negative -- the demand
curve for grain for consumption (including use as feed) is
negatively sloped. If C t  is the total amount of'grain made
available at time t , then the price, pt which will rule
in a competitive market-clearing situation at time t is
(4.2) Pt = Pt(C t)
The Objective Function
We shall take as the money equivalent to an amount x
of consumption of wheat the area under demand curve (4.1)
from zero to x :
(4.3) Vt(x) = /p t()d •
As in the Crusoe Case, we can then represent the value of a
twelve-month consumption sequence as
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(4.4) E Vt(Ct )
t=l
As before, let Qt represent the total amount of grain stored
from period t to period t+l , and assume that a fraction
(1-6) of the stored grain is lost to insects, etc. Let Gt
continue to represent the grain harvest in time period t
Then the consumption in t equals the -grain harvested in that
period plus "inheritance" from the previous period less in-
ventories held over to period t+l :
(4.5) Ct = Gt + (1-6)Qt- - Qt
Assuming no risk-aversion on the part of the social evaluator
and subject to the usual qualifications about summing gains
and losses to different individuals we can write as the
objective of policy to maximize the expected value of annual
consumption less storage costs:
(4.6) W = E i (vt ( Ct) - TC(Qt))
where E is the expectation operator and, as before, TC(Q)
is the cost of storing Qt units of grain for one period,
with the Ct ' s conforming to (4.5). We think of the har-
vests Gt as specified by Nature, while the inventories
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are determined by profit-maximizing inventory holders. By
introducing improved information the choices of inventory
holders are affected, with the resulting effect on welfare
measured in dollars by the change in W
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5. The Relationship Between Inventories and Forecasts in a
Competitive Model.
The Behavior of Inventory Holders
We assume there to be N inventory holders and let
(5.1) q = the amount stored by inventory holder i
from t to t+l
(5.2) TCi(q) = the period t dollar cost of holding qt
We shall assume that the same fraction 6 of
inventories is lost from period-to period for all inventory
holders.
Inventory holders attempt to make profits by buying
cheap in one period and selling dear in the future, taking
into account storage costs and deterioration of the grain in
storage. We shall assume that inventory holders buy and sell
in either the spot or future markets and that they are com-
petitors, believing themselves able to buy and sell all they
wish to at the quoted price. By assuming away transactions
costs we can reduce the inventory holder's problem to a
one-period one.
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5.2
To develop this, first ignore the futures market and
define
8,3) Pt=t+j the spot price which, looking ahead from
period t , is forecast by inventory holder i
to prevail in period t+j
Suppose that inventory holder i is currently holding qt
and is considering adding another ton to storage. He expects
this will increase the amount he can sell next period by
i
(1-6) units, for which he anticipates he will receive Pt
dollars. This is equivalent to ptt+(l-6)/(l+r) period
t dollars in extra revenue, where r is the market rate of
interest. This amount is to be compared with the sum of the
extra purchase cost, pt, and the extra storage cost, which
we shall denote by MC(q) . If the difference is positive,
there is an expected profit to be made from the procedure.
Hence assuming that the inventory holder is an
expected profit maximizer we conclude that he will hold qt
only if
i 4)-6) (p + (t)) 0
(5.4) Pt,t+l (l+r) i
( < 0 implies q =  )
Condition (5.4) it will be noted, is the necessary condition
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for maximization of profit from a one-period transaction,
i.e., the maximization of Pt,t+l qt(l-6)/(l+r) - pt qt -'TCi(q)'
and it is not difficult to show that this maximization is
necessary for the maximization of the expected present value of
speculative profits from an entire sequence of inventory
decisions.
Futures Markets Introduced
Suppose now that a futures market is available in
which the inventory holder can,-in effect, carry out the
future sale or purchase in the present. Denote by Pt,t+l
the period t+l price quoted on the futures market at period t.
If we do not here concern ourselves overly with refinements
of the theory of capital rationing, a condition of general
equilibrium in a world of expected profit maximizers is
(5.5) p = l for all it,t+l Pt,t+l
(More generally, condition(5.5) must hold for all traders in
the futures market.) That is, at the margin all agents must
have the same price expectation as that recorded in the
futures market quotations. Hence our condition for individual
profit maximization implies that
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(1-6) )(5.6) t,t+ (+r) Pt - MC(q )t 0
( < 0. =4q = 0).
Condition (5.6) simply characterizes the lack of opportunity
for arbitrage by buying grain in one period and selling it
forward at a price that more than covers the known storage
plus waiting costs.
The important function of the futures market in this
analysis is to coordinate expectations of different inventory
holders. This will allowus to aggregate their choices.
Market Clearing
What determines the various prices, actual and expected?
The actual current price is that determined by demand curve (4.1)
to clear the market when the sum of new harvests plus old
inventories less additions to inventories is offered for
consumption. That is,
N N
(5.7) Pt = Pt(Gt + (i-6) E qt-l qt
The forecast prices could, of course, be anything, but we
shall assume that they are derived from forecasts of quantities
offered for sale in the future. Let
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N i
(5.8) Qt = qti=l
and let
(5.9) Qi the forecast at time t by inventory holdert,t+k
iof Qt+k k = 0, 1, 2,....
Finally, let
(5.10) G = the forecast at time t by inventory holdert,t+k
i of Gt+k , k = 1, 2,.
Then the market supply to consumers expected at period t
by inventory holder i to prevail in period t+l is given by
(5.11) Ct i  G +(1-6) Q, QS t,t+l = Gt,t+l (1-6) t,t t,t+l
We shall assume that inventory holders behave as though en-
dowed with knowledge of demand curve(4.1). This implies
(5.12) P pt,t+l t+ (C ttt+1 t+1 t,t+l
Thus to determine his current inventory, holder i
must forecast next period's harvest and the aggregate inventory
behavior this period and next period. Better crop prediction
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affects his forecast of next period's harvest, but the inven-
tory holder's use of this information depends upon the way
in which he forecasts the behavior of other inventory holders.
Thus to determine how information affects the flow of grain
consumption in the market economy (equivalently in our model,
the sequence of spot prices) we must construct a theory of
the way in which the individual agent forecasts aggregate
inventory holdings.
Inventory Forecasting in the One-Inventory-Holder Model
Things are simplified, notationally and otherwise,
in the case in which there is only one inventory holder.
Then we can drop the superscript and treat the aggregate
inventory as identical to the individual agent's inventory.
Our inventory holder's problem is in effect to predict his
own behavior. An appealing assumption is that he will deter-
mine the principles guiding his current action and operate
on the basis that he will use the same principle to deter-
mine his actions in the future.
Our agent has at time t a model for predicting the
spot price of grain at any future date t+k , namely the
appropriate version of expression (5.12) which we reproduce as:
(5.13) Pt,t+k= Pt+k(Gt,t+k + (1-6) Qt,t+k-i t,t+k
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Furthermore, he knows that his inventory choice at,.say, time
t+k will be governed by the profit-maximization condition
(5.6), which we reproduce as condition (5.14) on forecast Qt+k
1-6(5.14) Ptt+k+l ( l-r ) - Pt,t+k - MC(Qtt+k) < 0
( < 0 ~ t,t+k = 0
Using (5.13) twice we can express conditions (5.14) as a dif-
ference equation/inequality in forecast inventories:
1-6(5.15) ) Pt+k+l(Gt,t+k+l + (1-6) Qt,t+k - Qt,t+k+l)
1 (G + (1-6) Q + MC(Q < 0t+k t,t+k t,t+k+1 t,t+k t,t+k- P (Gt, + + (1-6) Qt,t - - t,t+k ) + C(Qtt+k)  0
( < 0 Qt,t+k = 0 )
Hidden behind the forest of. notation in (5.15) is a very
simple relationship among Qt,t+k-l' Qt,t+k and Qt,t+k+l
In its equality form (5.15) is thus a second order difference
equation. If we adopt the convention that
(5.16) Qt,t- Qt-1
then condition (5.15) holds for k = 0, 1, 2, ...
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Continuing to think of (5.15) in its equality form,.
we know that a second order difference equation has a solu-
tion unique up to the specification of two parameters. These
are determined by two boundary conditions, frequently spec-
ified by given values of the first two terms in the sequence
of values of the dependent variable. However, in this case
we are given only one boundary condition, the inherited value
of inventories, Qt- . The remaining condition must be pro-
vided by some sort of condition on Qt,t+k as k approaches
infinity. The structure of the model alone at this point
does not determine inventory choices. It is necessary to
introduce further information or constraints on the formation
of the inventory holder's expectations. We shall consider
this problem now.
The discussion in the previous paragraph treated
(5.15) as a difference equation. However, condition (5.15)
may also hold as an inequality, in.which case new features
are introduced. In one respect these features are welcome,
in that they help to provide the second boundary condition
we need. In another respect they are unwelcome, since they
introduce an inherent non-linearity into the relationship
between inventories and crop forecasts, a complication for
computation and for econometric work.
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Recall that expression (5.15) is derived from con-
dition (5.14) of profit-maximization which says loosely that
if you do not expect the price of grain to rise enough be-
tween now and next period to compensate for determination of
stored stocks and cover storage and interest costs then you
should sell off all your inventories today. Characteristically,
ignoring inflation, the spot prices of agricultural crops go
through a yearly cycle; in particular they drop when the main
harvest is brought in. For those typical price patterns con-
dition (5.14) holds as an inequality at least once per year.
This has the plausible corollary that inventories are reduced
essentially to zero at least once per year, just before the
main harvest.
Of course, for crops which are sufficiently storable,
this regular pattern may be broken for one or several cycles,
during which stocks are never eliminated and real price rises
continually. This might happen, for example, as a result of
a succession of bad harvests. However, for the typical case
the inventory holder's expectations, at least for the periods
in the future beyond those for which he has current informa-
tion, must be for a zero inventory level recurring at.a regular
cyclical interval. If we can develop an explicit model of
when the first zero inventory level will be predicted to occur
we shall have determined the solution of (5.15). Suppose,
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for example, that we conclude Qt,t+k* =0, and for k < k*,
t, t+kQ  > 0. Then between t and t+k*-1 expression (5.15)
holds as an equality. Taken together these conditions will
determine the values of Q t,tQt,t+Q ,...t,t+k-1 Of
these our interest is really only in Qt,t ' the current in-
ventory decision.
Inventories Non-Linear in Forecasts
An unfortunate feature of this model of the deter-
mination of inventories is that for the simple linear ver-
sion of (5.15) in which we would obtain inventories linearly
dependent upon crop forecasts if (5.15) held as an equality
we now obtain a non-linear relationship. This is easily
illustrated. Let us suppose that the available evidence
predicts a bumper harvest next period. And let us suppose
that this prediction places beyond a shadcw of a doubt the
conclusion that the real price of grain will decline between
this period and next. My optimal policy as an inventory
holder, then, is to sell off any stocks I may have today.
Now consider the value to me of improved accuracy in the
prediction of next period's crop. Since I am already cer-
tain that the price will decline, my action will not in the
least be affected by pinpointing exactly how much the price
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will decline. My response -- eliminating my inventories --
is non-linear in crop forecasts.
Because the response of inventories is non-linear in
this way, so is the value of information about crops. Often
even rough forecasts may make it clear that the price will
decline next period. Increased forecast accuracy is only
valuable for the cases in which a difference in the forecast
leads to a different decision, which is to say in which the
current inventory is non-zero.
This sort of non-linearity generalizes. Let us sup-
pose that, on the basis of current information I now, in
March, say, expect inventories to be driven to zero at the
end-of June as the price falls with a large incoming harvest
in July. Quite plausibly, even rather large changes in my
expectation for the July, August or September harvests would
not affect my expectation that inventories will be zero at
the end of June. Only by changing the month in which inven-
tories are expected first to fall to zero, can changes in
forecast harvests beyond that date affect my current decision.
On the other hand, changes in any of the monthly harvests
forecast to occur before the end of the month at which in-
ventories go to zero do affect the current inventory. Accuracy
in these forecasts is correspondingly valuable.
There remains the possibility that forecast error
could lead to the wrong month being predicted as the date on
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which inventories are first zero. Let us suppose, for
example, that I am making my inventory decision in March and
I know the harvests with perfect accuracy into the distant
future. Suppose further that in view of these forseen
harvests I expect to hold positive inventories beyond the
current harvest year, with inventories expected to be zero
at the end of May, a year and two months hence. Now consider
how my decision is affected by a changed forecast of the
harvest expected in the coming August. As that anticipated
harvest increases, the need to hold current wheat for con-
sumption beyond the coming August decreases, reflected in
my market predictions by reduction in the expected price
beyond that month. There will be a critical level of the
anticipated August crop (given the levels of the remaining
montht' harvests) below which I shall plan on having my
inventories run down to zero at the end of the approaching
May, two months hence, and above which I shall plan on having
my inventories run down to zero twelve months later. It is
thus possible that errors of measurement could lead us to
guage incorrectly the earliest zero-inventory date.
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Review of the Reasoning
Let us recapitulate. The difference equation/inequality
system (5.15) is an expression of'the no-profitable-arbitrage-
possible characteristic of speculative market equilibrium
coupled with an assumption that inventory holders behave as
though they know the demand and marginal cost structure of the
market. This system constrains at each date the current in-
ventory as well as a sequence of anticipated inventories,
given an inherited inventory, and a sequence of anticipated
monthly harvests, including the current one. Suppose we know at
*
time t the earliest time t+k at-which the inequality of system
(5.15) holds. (Incidentally, any other method of determining
a future inventory would do, provided we could be sure the
intervening constraints hold as equalities.) With this infor-
mation the sequence of inventories Qtt (the current decision),
Qt,t+l''' Qt,t+k*-l (the forecast future decisions),is com-
pletely determined, since the k* conditions (5.15) corres-
ponding to these inventories hold as equalities. We are not
really interested in the forecast future inventories, but
these must be determined simultaneously with current inven-
tories. The subset of conditions (5.15) just singled out
determines Qtt to Qt,t+k*-l implicitly as functions of
Qt-l and GttG through Gt,t+k* . With a sufficiently
simple structure, this system can be solved explicitly, giving
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us an expression for Q in terms of inherited inventories,
present and forecast future harvests. Knowing the distri-
bution of errors.of forecast due to measurement, we can trans-
late these into a distribution of current inventory decisions,
given k*.
If, instead of a single number, k* , we are given a
distribution of numbers, we can, clearly, repeat the procedure
just described for each value of k* , and compute the re-
sulting distribution of current inventory. All that is left
out is the possibility that forecast error causes an incorrect
choice of k As we'shall see when we turn to the deter-
mination of k* , it depends on Qt-1 and the sequence of
forecast present and future harvests. Thi's means that we
could, in principle, compute a distribution for Qt,t from
a knowledge of the standard harvest pattern, actual inherited
inventories, nature's distribution of shocks to the standard
harvest patterns, and the properties of the errors in the fore-
casting system. Even under simple assumptions as to functional
form, however, the calculations would have to be numerical
and would be exceedingly complex. The method we have chosen
to simplify this procedure has as a weak point the necessity
of neglecting the interaction between measurement error and
the determination of k* . As far as we can tell the bias
thus introduced is small and of undeterminate direction.
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Once we have established for each month t a distri-
bution of the associated parameter k*(t) our system (20)
determines a distribution of Qt,t. This is the "rule" by
which the one-inventory holder market system relates forecast
harvests to current inventories, the relationship required
in order to evaluate the worth of improvements in forecast
accuracy. Before we turn to the derivation of the distti-
bution of k*(t) , let us turn briefly to the question of
what adjustment needs to be made to re-introduce many inven-
tory holders.
Inventory Forecasting in the Many-Inventory-Holder Model
To generalize the preceding analysis to a world of
many inventory holders, we again appeal to the ability of
our model agents to solve implicitly rather difficult math-
ematical problems. In this case we rely on their being able
to convert a quoted sequence of spot and future prices for
grain, via a knowledge of the demand function for grain and
the supply function of storage (the economy's marginal cost
of storage function), and a knowledge of forecast current and
future harvests, into the consistent sequence of current and
forecast aggregate inventory levels. This is the second point
at which we have used both an implausible knowledge of the
structure of the economy and an-implausible capabity for cal-
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culations, in developing our model. While it would be desir-
able to have a more "realistic" theory in this regard, how-
ever, it is not clear that the obvious sorts of rule of thumb
models of behavior (trend extrapolation, etc.) are superior,
and they would, we think, be, an impediment to clarity in,
the picture we are to draw.
Our inventory holder speculators are operating in this
model with an estimate of the factual state of affairs
which is consistent with the information from the forecasting
system and the known prices quoted on the various markets.
This consistency is desirable as proof against results which
follow from ad hoc assumptions. None the less, further atten-
tion to the aggregation problem would be desirable.
Closing the Dynamic System1
We conclude this section by discussing the way in,
which the missing second boundary condition for the system
(5.15) is obtained. We assume that the inventory holders
use the announced forecast harvests for as far into the future
as these can be calculated from known information. Recall-
ing the discussion in Section 2, we regard inventory holders
t+i
as replacing G in (5.15) by SAL for values of i
up to M . Beyond that point in the future inventory hold-
ers are assumed to adopt as forecasts simply the a priori
1 Readers may wish to omit the rather technical discussion in
this and the next subsections and go directly to Section 6.
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harvest pattern which we have called the standard harvest
pattern. This pattern, it will be recalled, is periodic,
with a period of twelve months.
Consider first the case in which the forecast har-
vest sequence is itself the standard harvest sequence. It
can be shown that corresponding to any given periodic har-
vest sequence there exists a sequence of inventories, which
is itself periodic with period twelve and which satisfies
conditions (5.15). Furthermore we know that the inventory
sequence has at least one zero element, to which corresponds
a strict inequality in (5.15). Furthermore, while we have
not yet attempted to prove this, it seems likely (since storage
is costly, in effect a dampening force) that given any non-
negative inherited inventory Qt-l , there is a solution
to system (5.15) which is ultimately purely periodic. The sys-
tem tends- toward a steady-state inventory path. That is,.
given any Qt-i , if the harvests G describe a periodic
path, for J large enough there is a solution to (5.15) such
that Q follows the steady state path for j > J.tt+
Intuitively speaking, if we look far enough into.the
future, assuming no trend in harvests, we must bet that at
the end of May inventories will be zero if, on average, crop
flow begins to build up sharply at that time. This provides
**
us with a date, t+k , such that Qtt+k** must be zero.
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This is obviously a step forward, but it does not
provide us immediately with the ability to solve system (5.15)
for the values of Q to Qt,t+k**-l , of which Q is
our true objective. What we require is the smallest integer,
which we have called k*(t) , such that Qt,t+k*(t) .
Given k , the problem reduces to one of solving a system of equations.
Finding a Market Solution
Suppose we had a solution to system (5.15) augmented
by the condition Qt,t+k** = 0 , where by "solution" we mean
a sequence Q t,t' "' Qt,t+k**- such that for each element
either the corresponding constraint is binding (and hence
satisfied as an equality) or not binding (in which case the
corresponding Q is zero). All we would need to do to
determine the inventory carry-over horizon, k*(t), would
be to look for the first non-binding constraint. For example,
if the very first condition is satisfied as an inequality,
we would say k*(t) = 0 : the number of months remaining
until inventories are sold off to zero is zero.
**
Once we have established k , then, all we need to
do is find a feasible solution to the inequality system con-
**
sisting of the k conditions on Q through Q
from system (5.15). Although in principle a simple matter,
finding such soultions is not a standard computational pro-
cedure. The problem can, fortunately, be converted to one
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for which well developed computational routines exist by
recognizing that a solution to our k inequalities Xwith
the prescribed nQn-negativity and complementary slackness
properties) corresponds to an optimum of a non-linear pro-
gramming problem. We simply take as the objective function
of this artificial problem the sum of the products of each
Qt+j with its corresponding constraint function. We then
t,t+j
attempt to maximize this sum of products subject to (a) the
non-negativity of inventories, Qt,t+j ' and (b) the satis-
faction of our k** inequalities from (5.15). If there is
a solution to our original problem this derived problem will
also have a solution and will yield an objective function value
of zero. This is so because a solution to our original pro-
blem has non-negative inventories, satisfies (5.15), and has
a zero value of the constraint corresponding to any positive
inventory. The sum of products of inventories and their con-
straints is thus zero at a solution to the original problem.
That this is the maximum value of the objective function
to our derived programming problem follows from the fact that
is is feasible and that the value of the objective function
for any feasible vector of inventories is non-positive
(inventories being non-negative and constraint functions being
non-positive).. Since zero is as large as the sum of pro-
ducts can be the feasible solution to our original problem
is an optimum of the derived one.
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The logic works the other way. If we can find a
solution to the derived problem which has the value of its
objective function equal to zero, the inventories form a
feasible solution to our original problem. The lowest num-
bered constraint satisfied as a strict equality corresponds
to Qt,t+k* In short, we shall have computed k*
If the derived problem is not feasible or has an
objective function value less than zero at its optimum then
the original problem does not have a solution. This pro-
vides us with a convenient check on the "reasonableness" of
empirical specification of system (20), to which we now turn.
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~. Empirical Implementation in a Linear Model of the U.S.
Wheat Market
In the preceding section we have developed a method
for evaluating measurement improvements in forecasting crops.
The model includes demand functions for grain to consume or
use as an input and a cost function of grain storage. To
implement the analysis we require empirically estimated ver-
sions of these, together with observations or assumptions
about the discount rate, r , and the rate of deterioration,
. Finally, in order to establish the month-byf-month
distribution of k* , the inventory carry-over horizon, we
require a specification of the way in which Nature is assumed
to generate grain harvests. All of these empirical data have
been assembled for the case of wheat crop forecasting in
the United States, using linear specifications for the demand
and marginal cost functions. The details of these estimations
and of some of the derivations have been placed in appendices
for easy reference. In this section we shall attempt to des-
cribe in a compressed fashion how all the pieces fit together
to produce an estimate of the value of reducing measurement error.
It bears repeating at this point that we have viewed
the calculation of a single number to represent the.value of
better wheat information as secondary to the development of
a sound, empirically implementable method for performing such
calculations. Such an emphasis will justify the length to
66
6.2
which we have gone here to explain procedures and reasoning.
(This is not to say the empirical results are merely "illus-
trative.")
Assume, then, that demand and marginal cost functions
are given by
pt(c) = at - bC
(6.1)
MC(Q) = d + eQ ,
where at is periodic with period 12 (at+12 = at  for all t).
(These expressions could, of course, be linear approximations
to relationships which are actually non-linear..) Our system
(515)becomes then a linked series of linear inequalities in
which forecasts enter as constant terms, determining the
intercepts. These inequalities can be written as (for
k = 0,1,... ),
Qt,t+k+1
(6.2) [A A A_ Q DG + DG + F1 o'-1 t,.t+k 1 t,t+k+l o t,t+k t+k
t,t+k-1
where
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S (1-6)
A b1 (l+r)
A E - b ( + ) - eo (l+r)
A-1  b (1-6)
-1
(1-6)D1 = b (-D1 (l+r)
D - b
F = a (1-6)
t+k t+k (l+r) t+k+1 +d
and where
(<) tt+k = 0
Note that, because the coefficients ai  are periodic with
period 12, so are. coefficients F .
t+k
The parameters at and b were estimated for the
total "domestic disappearance" of wheat in the United States. (See
Appendix A for details.) The marginal cost of storage function
was estimated from time .series data on the spread between spot
and futures prices and total stocks on hand in the United
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States. (See Appendix B.) Efforts :to estimate 6
empirically were unsuccessful. Persons knowledgeable in the
wheat market regard 6 as effectively zero, and this was
the value used in our calculations. The discount rate, r,
used in the estimation was the rate of interest for prime
commercial paper. Over the sample period for the demand
function estimates, 1955-1971, itaveraged roughly .005 per
month. This was therefore used in the evaluation procedures.
These data and the derived values for the parameters of
system (6.2) are presented in Table 6.1.
If we are now given a value for k*(t) we can,
using (6. 2) express Q as a linear combination of the
inherited inventory, Qtt- (= Qt) and "forecasts,"
G t,tGtt+,...,Gt,t+k* . The term "forecasts" is in quo-
tation marks because, in general, only the first few months
of harvests will be forecast on the basis of actual data
(how many depends upon AL, the availability lag). The
remainder will consist of the appropriate sequence of ele-
,ments from the standard harvest pattern, GI,...,G 12
The social objective function in the linear model
becomes a quadratic in consumption and inventory levels:
12 C. Qi
(6.3) p [f Pi(E)d - I MC(C)d ]
i=l 0 o o
12 b 2 e 2
S(aici 2 i i Q ii=l
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TABLE 6.1: Parameters Used in Evaluation and
Monte Carlo Calculations
Pt = at - bC t  (t in 1958 cents,
Ct in millions of bushels per month)
a = 362.2 a7 = 384.0
a = 374.1 a = 421.62 .8
a3 = 352.3 a9 = 393.9
a4 = 330.6 al10 = 366.2
a5 = 308.8 all =  338.5
a6 = 346.4 a2 = 350.3
b = 4.3851
MC = d + eQt (MC in 1958 cents,
Q in millions of bushels)
d = -0.0207
e = 0.0003349
A = 4.3633 F 1 = -10.06 F = -35.52
A = -8.7488 F = 23.53 F = 29.64
o 2 8
A = 4.3851 F = 23.32 F 9 ~ 29.50
- 3 9
D1 = 4.3633 F 4 = 23.32 F10 = 29.36
D = -4.3851 F =-35.90 F =-10.08
o 5 11
F 6 = -35.71 FI2 =-10.12
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We use identities (4.5). to express the social objective
function as a quadratic in inventories, Qo to Q12' and
actual harvests.
Each inventory in turn is expressable via the system
(5.15).(recall the assumed sequence of values of k*(t)) as
a linear function of forecasts and once-lagged inventory.
The forecasts are either elements of the standard harvest
^t+kpattern or estimates, St-AL of the ideal forecasts,
t+k 
^St-AL as described in Section 3. Recall that StAL
deviates from St-AL by a vector of measurement errors,
t-AL . Our linear expressions-for inventories in terms of
forecasts and lagged inventories can thus be replaced by
linear expressions in lagged inventories, ideal forecasts,
and measurement errors.
Since we assume that true ideal forecasts and
measurement errors have distributions which are periodic with
period 12 (e.g., loosely speaking, the error of observation
of June's harvest always has the same variance, ditto for
May, etc.), inventories will also have distributions which
are periodic. For example, the expected value of (Q )2 will
be the same as that of (Q1 2 )2 . Making the substitution
of Q12 for Qo , we can express the twelve inventories, Q1
to Q12 as linear functions of ideal forecasts and measurement
errors.
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6It will be recalled that in Section 3 we introduced
the assumption that measurement errors have expected value
zero and are distributed independently from each other and
all other variables of the system. A consequence is that
we can now express the variance of inventories as a linear
function of variances and covariances of ideal harvest fore-
casts plus a linear function of variances of the errors of
measurement. When we make the further assumption that the
distribution of the error of measurement depends only upon
the month of the harvest being measured (and not on the month
in which the measurement is taking place) we reduce the
number of measurement random variables to twelve (and several
of these will be identically zero). We denote the variance
of the error of measurement of month i's ideal harvest
as ER(i). Table 6.2 presents as an illustration the coeffi-
cients of each of the twelve monthly error variances (across
the rows) in the linear expression for January and June inven-
tory variances for the case of the structural parameters from
Table 6.1. Two cases are shown. The first assumes the k*
sequence: (k*(l), k*(2), ... , k*(12))= (4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 11, 10,
9, 8, 7, 6, 5), and an availability lag of zero. This k* sequence
is the simplest one, in which it is always anticipated that
inventories will be zero at the end of the next following May.
The second assumes the k* sequence (40, 39, 38, 37, 36, 35, 34,
33, 32, 31, 30, 29), and availability lag zero.
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Table 6.2: Coefficients of the Twelve Monthly Measurement Errors'
on the January and June Inventory Variances
Case 1. AL = 0 k* = 4,3,2,1,0,11,10,9,8,7,6,5
Case 2. AL = 0 k* = 40,39,38,37,36,35,34,33,32,43,42,41
Case 3. AL = 1 k* = 4,3,2,1,0,11,10,9,8,7,6,5
Case 4. AL = 1 k* = 40,39,38,37,36,35,34,33,32,43,42,41
Coefficient of ER Error of Measurement of Harvest in Month i
Inventory
Variance ER(1) ER(2) ER(3) ER(4) ER(5) ER(6) ER(7) ER(8) ER(9) ER(10) ER(11) ER.~A2)
Case.1. 1 .68146. .07764 .07671 .07539 .07345 .11550 .13736 .16661 .20622 .26179 .34325 .46964
6 .00656 .00655 .0 .0 .0 .8438 .00661 .00660 .00659 .00658 .00657 .00656
Case 2. 1 2.10690 1.20809 1.26691 1.33028 1.39866 1.47260.1.55355 1.64156 1.73749 1.84234 1.92462 2.01262
6 1.63518 1.71305 1.79676 1.88765 1.98577 2.09190 1.20760 1.27583 1.35021 1.43151 1.49486 1.56261
Case 3. 1 .68146 .07675 .07542 .07347 .07044 .11515 .13736 .16661 .20622 .26179 .34325 .46964
6 .00656 .0 .0 .0 .0 .84384 .00661 .00660 .00659 .00658 .00657 .00650
Case 4. 1 2.10598 1.20706 1.26576 1.32898 1.39719 1.47175 1.55262 1.64054 1.73637 1.84167 1.92387 2.01179
6 1.63387 1.71159 1.79586 1.88665 1.98463 2.09124 1.20688 1.27504 1.34934 1.43055 1.49379 1.56143
0.7
We know that the shorter is the availabilty lag,
the greater is the length of the "future" we can see, and
hence the more measurement errors have a chance to affect
current inventories. For example, the coefficients of the
twelve error variances in the expressions for the January
and July inventory for the two k* sequences with AL = 1
instead of AL = 0 are shown as in Case 3 and Case 4 of Table
6.2. These can be ccmpared with Case 1 and Case 2, respectively.
We observed that the social objective function could
be written as a quadratic expression in twelve random
inventories and ideal forecasts. The expected value of the
social objective function will then be linear in the means,
variances and covariances of the variables. We can think
of that expectation as the sum of an expectation of the
value of the objective function, given perfect information
(no measurement error) minus a term representing the loss
in value attributable to measurement error. It turns out
that the latter can be expressed as a linear combination
of the variances in inventories due to measurement errors.
Specifically, the loss due to measurement error is given by
12 -12
(6.4) (b + ) 2 4b 2
2 X N+l CQ.
i=l i=l
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where -b and e are the slopes of demand and marginal
storage cost functions, respectively, r is a coefficient
capturing the covariance of successive inventories, and the
variances in the expression are conditional upon everything
except the errors of measurement, i.e., they are due to
*
errors of measurement. Since the variances in (6.4) can
themselves be expressed as linear combinations of the
variances of the measurement errors we can, finally, express
the loss in expected value of the social objective function
due to measurement error, as a near combination of measure-
ment errors also. As before, these coefficients will de-
pend upon the parameters of the system as in Table 6.1.
and on the assumed sequence of inventory carry-over horizons,
k*-(t), as well as on the availability lag. Table 6.3
illustrates, for the same series of cases of k*(t) and
availability lag defined in Table 6.2, the coefficients of the
twelve measurement errors in the expected loss of social value
expression. (Cases 5 and 6 in Table 6.2 will be discussed shortly.)
The next step in the process is to obtain a distribution
of the sequences of inventory carry over horizons,
k*(l),...,k*(12). This was obtained in Monte Carlo simulations
of the operations of the wheat market; other grain markets can
also be simulated. Carrying out the Monte Carlo simulation,
a major undertaking, required, in addition to the parameters
* For details, see Appendix C.
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Table 6.3: Coefficients of Twelve Monthly Measurement
Errors in Expected Loss of Social Value Under
Various Assumptions
Case 1. AL = 0, k* = 4,3,2,1,0,11,10,9,8,7,6,5
2. AL = 0, k* = 40,39,38,37,36,35,34,33,32,43,42,41
3. AL =  1, k* = 4,3,2,1,0,11,10,9,8,7,6,5
4. AL = 1, k* = 40,39,38,37,36,35,34,33,32,43,42,41
5. AL = 0, Monte Carlo average
6. AL = 1, Monte Carlo. average
Coefficient of ER(i), Variance of Error of Measurement of Harvest in Month i
ER(1) ER(2) ER(3) ER(4) ER(5) ER(6) ER(7) ER(8) ER(9) ER(10) ER(11) ER(12)
Case 1. -2.0095 -2.0067 -1,9873 -1.9629 -1.9286 -2.0190 -2.0182 -2.0173 -2.0162 -2.0149 -2.0134 -2.0117
Case 2. -2.1330 -2.1303 -2.1274 -2.1243 -2.1210 -2.1174 -2.1145 -2.1114 -2.1081 -2.1402 -2.1380 -2.1356
Case 3. -2.0095 -1.9910 -1.9684 -1.9396 -1.8994 -2.0190 -2.0182 -2.0173 -2.0162 -2.0149 -2.0134 -2.0117
Case 4. -2.1316 -2.1288 -2.1258 -2.1226 -2.1192 -2.1164 -2.1135 -2.1103 -2.1069 -2.1391 -2.1367 -2.1342
Case 5. -2.0581 -2.0629 -2.1139 -2.0058 -2.1126 -2.1375 -2.1410 -2.1337 -2.1239 -2.1312 -2.1241 -2.1030
Case 6. -2.0534 -2.0556 -2.1057 -1.9957 -2.0998 -2.1363 -2.1394 -2.1317 -2.1215 -2.1284 -2.1201 -2.0995
6.9
of demand and marginal cost functions already described,
specification of the random process by which harvests are
generated. Key elements of this process are the standard
harvest pattern, and the parameters of a set of shocks by which
Nature is assumed to convert the standard harvests into actual
harvests in a sequence of steps.
In producing the Monte Carlo simulation it was
necessary to deal with one refinement which is relevant to the
subject of this section as well. Thus far we have been assuming
that the only uses of grain are for consumption or addition to
inventory. For a closed economy, or, alternatively, for a
model of the world grain market this dichotomy would be suffi-
cient. However, as our application will be-to domestic U.S.
consumption.and inventory behavior, we must introduce a third
use of grain, "exports." We recognized that a fully satis-
factory incorporation of the foreign trade in grain to our
theoretical and, more especially, to our empirical analysis
would introduce a very substantial increase in its complexity.
We therefore elected to use a naive model of export determination,
assuming
(6.5) EX. = f + gHi
where EX. is the quantity of wheat exported in month i ,
1
and H. is the actual amount harvested in month i
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The data on expotts make it clear that there is
little if any tendency for them to follow the seasonal pattern
of harvests. In fact, the average exports for the 1965-72
period for each of the four quarters were virtually identical.
The naive model (6.5) is thus obviously not a good one if
taken literally as a monthly model. However, it is a reason-
able one on an annual basis, saying simply that some portion
of the variation in actual harvests, up or down, will be
cushioned in its effects on domestic consumption by adjustment
in exports. For purposes of the Monte Carlo study, the inac-
curacy of the month-by-month pattern of exports generated by
model (6.5) was deemed unimportant, while for the later use
we shall make of that model in this section principle interest
attaches to the coefficient of actual harvests, H. , which
will be the same for monthly and annual models. The details
on estimation of the parameters of (6.5) lead to the follow-
ing results:
(6.6) f = 8.6, g = 0.425
Table 6.4 summarizes the harvest pattern used as the basis
for the Monte Carlo study; included as well are "steady
state" export and effective harvest patterns for subsequent
use in the analysis.
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Table 6.4 Standard Harvest Pattern Used in the Monte Carlo Study
to Determine Distribution of Inventory Carry Over
Horizon, Along with Steady State Exports and Effective
Harvests
(Millions of Bushels)
(1) (2) (3)
Harvests Exports Net Effective Harvests (= ()-(2)
(H.) (EX.) (G.)
January 0.0 58.2 
-58.2
February 0.0 58.2 
-58.2
March 0.0 58.2 
-58.2
April 0.0 58.2 
-58.2
May 12.3 58.2 
-45.9
June 453.0 58.2 394.8
July 492.7 58.2 434.5
August 374.9 58.2 316.7
September 76.9 58.2 18.7
October 6.4 58.2 
-51.8
November 0.0 58.2 
-58.2
December 0.0 58.2 
-58.2
Note: Total Harvests and Exports Represent Averages for the Years 1965-
1972.
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In the Monte Carlo study the harvests in Column (1)
of Table 6.4 were subjected to shocks before exports were
determined by (6.5) and subtracted in any month to yield a
net effective harvest for domestic purposes. 'The distri-
bution of these shocks was estimated from data on annual
harvest variance.
Using these parameters a fifty year "history" of the
system was generated with the primary objective to obtain a
distribution of the sequences of k*. The results could
be discussed at great length. 'These are interesting on
their own, but we simply note here how very much the horizon
shifts over time, a result in part of the very low cost of
storing wheat. According to this model, holding periods of
over three years are not unexpected. To each k* sequence
corresponds a set of coefficients such as in Table 6.3 By
calculating all of these coefficient sets and averaging them to-
gether in the proportions in which the k* sequences occurred
in fifty year simulated history, we'obtained the expected value
of twelve coefficients of monthly measurement error in the
calculation of social loss. These are listed, for AL 0
AL = 1 as Cases 5 and 6, respectively, in Table 6.3.
We are now at the point at which all we need to esti-
mate the loss to the economy due to forecast measurement error
Actually two twenty-eight year histories were run. The first
three years of each were discarded to eliminate any bias
introduced by the start-up position.
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is a set of twelve measurement error variances. These statis-
tics are unfortunately elusive. Part of the difficulty
results from our use of the concept of an ideal forecast, e.g.
26S 2 3 , which is not directly observable. Thus we cannot simplyAo
look at a series of estimates, S? and compare them with the1
after-the-fact known values S? in order to estimate the error1
variance. In order to construct observations of true values
of S? we should have to know the precise components of the1
forecasting formula used (in this case by the USDA) and to
have available a series of before- andafter-the-fact values
for these components. From after-the-fact values of the com-
ponents one could calculate an ideal forecast.
A key example of such a component is planted
acreage. This statistic is used in the formula for con-
structing forecasts, and it is especially with respect to
estimating this statistic that satellite technology offers
great advantages. For illustrative purposes let us suppose
this is all the information that is required to make a
forecast. The acreage of a crop planted at a specified
time is recorded in successive months as it varies due to
changing farmer decisions, weather vagaries, etc. At each
point a forecast of the harvest from this planting is made
by multiplying the acreage by some biologically determined
constant. In this illustrative case, any error in measuring
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the acreage translates into an equal percentage deviation
between actual and ideal forecasts of the harvest from that
planting.
The example is apt in illustrating a difficulty in
estimating measurement errors even of the component, in this
case acreage. For there is no "true" acreage figure ever
discovered. We cannot simply compare a measured and actual
series. Rather measurement errors have to be guessed at
by applying a statistical theoretical model to the sampling
procedure.
Errors in estimating acreage will be only one source
of deviation between actual and ideal forecasts. Information
can be obtained as a crop matures which enable the yield per
acre to be forecast. If this information is subject to error
it will also cause a deviation between actual and ideal fore-
cast. (Keep in mind that.even the ideal forecast is subject
to Nature's variability, the unpredictable in the future.)
Roughly speaking, if the errors of measurement of yield and
acreage are independent the variance of the deviation.between
ideal and actual forecast will be the sum of the variances
of the two errors of component measurement.
Lacking adequate measurements of the errors of measure-
ment of ideal forecasts at this point we must present a para-
metric summary of results. The coefficients summarized in
Cases 5 and 6 of Table 6.3 in effect already present a para-
metric set of answers, but the number of parameters is un-
wieldy. That formula gives us the value of the loss due to
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measurement error as a function of the twelve monthly error
variances, ER(1),...,ER(12) . This may be further simpli-
fied if we assume further that the errors in any forecast
tend to be proportional to the true value.
Recall that the actual forecast at time i of the
harvest at time j , S differs from the ideal forecast,
S ,by the measurement error . We assume that the
standard deviation of is proportional to H , where
Hj is the standard actual harvest for month j . Specifi-
cally, assume that
(6.7) ER(j) = variance (qi = ' )2
1.96
With this assumption we are saying roughly that the estimated
forecast will differ from the ideal forecast for that month
by less than 100a percent 95% of the time.
It is apparent from (6.7) that the loss to the economy
due to measurement error will be simply proportional to a2
The estimated expected coefficient of 2 is 3306.7
for the case of AL = 1 and 3309.0 for the case of AL = 0,
where loss is measured in millions of dollars per year. The
lowest curve in Figure 6.1 graphs the relationship for AL = 0.
The equation is LOSS = 3309.1'2
These results indicate that starting from a measure-
ment error that is within 10% about 95% of the time and moving
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ing to zero measurement error would be worth 33,091,6000
1958 dollars per year in perpetuity if the wheat system
were basically stationary at the level of the late 1960's.
Adjusting to 4th quarter 1973 price level makes the
relationship LOSS = 5294. 4a 2 ,in millions of dollars,
graphed as the middle curve in Figure 6.1.
It will be useful to make some adjustment for the
fact that the actual system for which the value of information
is being sought is a growing one. While there is some loose-
ness in making a simple adjustment for this since the distri-
bution of k was obtained in a (stochastically) stationary
model and since population and time variables enter explicitly
to the estimated demand functions, it should be roughly the
case that in an economy in which the population is growing
a 2% per year, the expected losses due to measurement error,
instead of being a constant annuity, will be an annuity grow-
ing at 2% per year. To convert this growing stream of losses
into an equivalent constant annuity, we require an assumed
discount rate. Without wishing to become involved in the
controversy over the appropriate social discount rate, but
at the same time wishing to reduce the number of free param-
eters to be carried.along in describing our results, we have
assumed a discount rate of 6% (in real terms). This implies
that the losses thus far should be increased by 50%.* The
For those wishing to substitute their own assumptions about
population growth and discount rate, the multiplicative
factor is r/(r-p), where r is the discount rate and p
the population growth rate.
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A: 1973 Prices Allowing for Population
GrowthB B: 1973 Wheat Prices
C: 1958 Wheat Prices
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Figure 6.1: Annual Loss When Measurement
Percentage Standard Deviation is
Alpha/2, Assuming AL = 0
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resulting relationship between measurement parameter, a
and expected loss due to measurement error, is shown as
the uppermost curve in Figure 6.1.
One further adjustment is desirable, to account for
the tendency for variation in actual harvests to be compen-
sated for by offsetting changes in exports. The loss estim-
ates thus far have been based on a factor of proportionality
between the average actual harvests by month and the 95%
confidence interval on measurements. These measurement errors
will not translate into equivalent errors in the ideal fore-
casts of effective harvest, actual harvests less exports.
According to our estimated naive model a unit change in
actual harvest will tend cause on average a change of .575
units of effective harvest. To adjust for this we must mul-
tiply the expected losses, which are linear functions of the
measurement error variances of effective harvests, by (.575)2
= .331 . The resulting relationship between loss and the
factor referring to errors of measuring actual harvest is
given by LOSS = 2628.7a2 , and graphed in Figure 6.2.
It is obvious that the worth of improved information
is highly sensitive to the value of a , and it would be most
desirable to have accurate information about both its current
value and the sorts of improvement obtainable through satel-
lite technology. We must strongly emphasize that adequate
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statistics on this subject are not available in the sources
we have seen. Available studies, such as that by Gunnelson,
Dobson and Pamperin tend to focus on forecast error, which
is a compound of Nature's variance and variance introduced
by the measurement system. Statistics on forecast error
contain, of course, some information constraining measure-
ment error, but drawing implications from them requires very
strong assumptions as to the underlying model. For our pur-
poses these data are not suitable.
In their study of the value of improved statistical
reporting, Hayami and Peterson encountered much the same
**
sort of problem. In their Table 1 (Ibid, p. 125) they pre-
sent data on "typical sampling error" in major U.S. farm
commodities prepared by the Statistical Reporting Service,
U.S. Department of Agriculture. The methods by which the
U.S.D.A. calculated these statistics are not specified, nor
are definitions of the usual sort provided. By making some
assumptions, however, we can use these data as the basis
for plausible illustrative values in exploring our own results.
Again, we would stress that these figures should be regarded
as far from well established.
Gunnelson, G., W.D. Dobson and S. Pamperin, "Analysis of
the Accuracy of USDA Forecasts," American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, November, 1972, pp. 639-645.
Hayami, Yujiro, and Willis Peterson, "Social Returns to
Public Information Services: Statistical Reporting of U.S..
Farm Commodities," American Economic Review, March 1972,
pp. 119-130.
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According to Hayami-Peterson, the U.S.D.A. as of
the time of their writing conducted their surveys with a
goal of attaining an average sampling error of 2 percent.
Hayami-Peterson Table 1 indicates that this overall average
performance corresponds to a sampling error of 2.1 percent
for wheat. The error presumably refers to annual harvests,
and we may regard it as applying to a sum of twelve monthly
harvests. Denote by p the error in measuring the annual
harvest, AH , and by Vi the error in measuring Hi , the
ideal forecast of the harvest in month i . Using "hats"
to denote measured quantities we have
AH = AH + 1
(6. 8)
H. = -H. + ~i
12 .
AH = C H.
i=l 1
implying, if the measurement errors are independent,.
12
(6.9) 2 0 2i=l i
By our assumption,
2
(6.10) 2 c~x
Pi 1.96
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Interpreting "average sample error" as the ratio of the standard
deviation of y to AH, we have, from Hayami-Peterson
(6.11) 2 = (2.1 AH)2
Substituting into (6.9), we have
(1.96)(2.1)
(6.12) 2=
Z h
i=1
where h. refers to the fraction of the annual crop
1
harvested in the ith month. Using the percentage distri-
bution of the wheat harvest as described previously,
the value of a can be calculated to be given by
^ (1.96)(2.1)
(6.13) a = 7.559 \ 7.6%(.2964)
The Task Force on Agricultural Forecasting at Goddard
attempts to assess likely improvements of ERS systems in
forecasts of annual crops in perspective to present USDA per-
formance. The results of the Task Force evaluation of likely
improvements by our ERS system is shown, graphically, in
Figure 6.3. Based on those results we may use the likely
improvement in measurement by 50% as a convenient basis
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of Crop Forecast Accuracy
Table 6.5 The Value of Reducing Measurement Error Based on
Goddard Task Force Results on ERTS
(million of 4th qtr. 1973 dollars annually)
a,95% confidence limit for percentage error
Price Elasticity in montnly harvest measurement
for Wheat Demand a] 6% 7.92% 91 10% 15.84% hT
1. -. 065 1 54.6 95.1 151.7 380.4
2. -.10 35.5 61.8 98.6 247.2
3. -.25 14.2 24.8 39.5 99.2
4. -.50 7.1 12.4 19.7 49.6
5. -0.75 4.8 8.2 13.2 32.8
a. United States domestic demand for all wheat, except as noted.
b. The authors of this report have estimated this value for "human
purposes" (food) elasticity of demand for wheat.
c. EarthSat estimate in recent report to U.S. Dept. of the Interior
d. 50% reduction in the basic estimate, No. 4:. for sensitivity analysis.
e. The basic estimate obtained by the authors for the price elasticity
of unconditional demand for wheat (1971 data)
f. 50% increase in the basic estimate, No. 4: for sensitivity analysis.
g. a derived from 2.2% error in annual harvest (May crop measurement
error for Winter Wheat).
h. a derived from 4.4% error in annual harvest (September crop measure-
ment error for Spring Wheat).
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for sensitivity analysis of the results. Table 6.5 gives the
value of 50% improvement (not including cost savings by USDA if
new methods are introduced and, of course, not netting out addi-
tional measurement costs) under a variety of changes in the
parameters of the model.
The results described in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.5
indicate both the possibility of very substantial gains from
reducing measurement errors in the crop forecasting system
and the extreme sensitivity of the results to the values of
current and potential measurement error variances.
Even relatively conservative assumptions (zero
population growth, better current measurement, smaller per-
centage gain in accuracy) seem to suggest a rather substantial
potential for gain from improved measurement accuracy. How-
ever, the great sensitivity of the results to variations in
percentage accuracy, indicate that to obtain reliable
estimates an effort must be. made to d-iscover more about current
and potential measurement error.
At the same time the results described should make
us sanguine about extending the measurements to other crops.
The procedures generalize without any difficulty, and there
is no obvious impediment to obtaining reasonably accurate
measurements of all of the important parameters, with the
exception, again, of the distributions of errors of
measurement.
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7. Concluding Remarks
All of the calculations in section 6 were directed
toward evaluating a reduction in measurement error. However,
as our discussion of forecasting in general in section 2
makes clear, the timeliness of information also importantly
affects its value. This would be expressed in our model
as reduced availability lag.. This is an area in which
satellite technology clearly promises substantial improve-
ment, and it is one which may even have the potential for
more substantial gains than found for measurement error
reduction. Our estimates suggest rather substantial month
to month variability in ideal forecasts, Nature's randomness.
By reducing the availability lag by one month, we, in effect,
eliminate one month's worth of variance. The value of this
should be comparable to that of a similar reduction of
variance due to measurement error improvement.
The components of this calculation are much the same
as those assembled in Section 6. However, the formulae are
more complex, owing to certain interactions among terms
which take place when variance is reduced in this way.
Programming and carring out these calculations should be a
high priority follow-up research item.
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Other extensions of the research are suggested by
a review of the results described in section 6, which come
at the end of a long and complex chain of reasoning and
calculation. It is appropriate at the end of this report,
then, to consider onceagain in summary fashion the links
of the chain, to assess their strength, and to indicate how
new ones can be added.
The basic logic of the model is simpler than its
many details may lead one to believe. Grain production is
taken to be exogenously given, but subject to random shocks
obeying a (possibly complex) stationary stochastic law.
Production in any period can be allocated to consumption
iincluding use in the production of other goods) or additions
to inventory. Inventories are determined by profit-seeking
competitive agents, who base their decisions on forecasts
of forthcoming grain harvests. In order to determine their
current inventory levels, these agents must anticipate the
future inventory levels as well as future harvests. They do
this by assuming that all inventory holders understand the
underlying demand and marginal storage cost relationships,
and hence they in effect look for a market clearing set of
spot and futures prices.
Given these facts, and having equipped ourselves
with knowledge of the demand and marginal storage cost
functions, we can describe the functional dependence of
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inventory decisions produced by the market system and
forecast harvests. This being the case, we can determine
the relationship between measurement errors, as leading to
forecast errors, and the average amount of variability to
be expected in the grain consumption flow. Variability is
a source of disutility -- marginal quantities of grain are
more highly.valued when consumption levels are low than
when they are high, as reflected in the demand curve. Hence
we can calculate the loss in value due to measurement error,
and the gain due to its amelioration.
The weakest links in this chain are probably the
early ones, for example, the very first one, which assumes
grain production is exogenously given. We have argued in
the text that a good case can be made for taking this
assumption as a working hypothesis. Nevertheless, we should
expect the results to be altered by the introduction of an
endogenous production decision model of farmer behavior.
That smoothing out of consumption and hence price movements
over time is likely to have value to farmers should be
obvious, given the history of the search for farm price
stability.
The second link, shows a related weakness, in
leaving out a set of decision makers. It was noted in the
text that production is allocated not simply to consumption
and inventory changes, but also to net exports, and in fact,
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the empirical parameters of a very simple model of export
determination importantly influenced the numerical results,
as summarized in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.5.. A final impor-
tant group of agents is omitted at the third link at which
it is assumed that grain inventories are determined by
private entrepreneurs. In fact, certainly in the United
States over the past twenty years, the government has been
a major agency determining the quantity of grain in inventory.
How greatly the absense of these decision agents
from the model affects the results is difficult to say.
Surely, leaving out the dependence of production on prices
causes our procedures to understate the value of improved
information. On the other hand, the fact that farmers must
make their planting decisions several months before har-
vesting leads us to guess that the additional benefit which
will be found upon incorporating production to the model
will be small relative to that attributed here to improved
inventory decisions.
The direction in which the results are biased by
our naive treatment of the export sector appears indeter-
minate. One could estimate the gain to the rest of the
world attributable to improved inventory choices in the
United States alone, and this would be expected to add to
the total benefit.. On the other hand, the extent to which
the export sector acts to dampen the variance of domestic
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consumption arising from variance in domestic production
is too cursorily treated here to give a reliable indication
of the results of a more careful study. Perhaps more impor-
tant than these effects will be the consequences of more
accurate forecasting of world-wide production. Since net
exports can be treated as negative harvests in the U.S.,
and since world production will greatly influence net exports,
the ability to predict world production has implications
for even domestic inventory allocation improvement much like
those studied here. (A whole-world model, on the other
hand, is in principle simpler again, since there are no net
exports.)
The policy of the U.S. government was, at least
in large measure, directed toward price stabilization of
grains over the past three or four decades. Insofar as the
government is completely successful in this effort, the role
of the private inventory holder is superceded, and specula-
tive inventories will not be held.* This would clearly affect
the analysis in a major way, presumably in the direction of
reducing the value of improved information, except, perhaps,
as it determines the government's decisions. The most
recent experience, of high grain.prices, has temporarily,
at least, taken the government out of the grain inventory
business, and the broad outlines of the competitive model
appear to hold.
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The general way in which these three additional
groups of agents can be systematically incorporated to the
model is suggested by the accounting identity (7.1),
(7.1) Ct = (1-6)(Q 1 + q 1 ) G - EX (QP + Q)
where QP , Qg, G, and EX, stand for, respectively,
private inventory holdings, government inventory holdings,
farm production, and net exports. Once these are determined,
so is consumption, and hence benefit level. While the dif-
ficulties are likely to be somewhat greater than those
encountered in this study, it would be interesting and useful
to attempt to relate the decisions of the three new agents to
the accuracy and timeliness of information for crop .-.
forecasting.
Extending the model to production decisions by
competitive farmers is not likely to involve more than com-
plication in the form of higher order difference equations,
etc.. While the computational problems this can pose can
be formidable, we would not anticipate major theoretical
difficulties. The more challenging task is incorporating
government and export sectors, particularly the former. The
problems one can anticipate in the case of international
demand are partly, again, those of sorting out the inter-
actions of competitive producers and inventory holders. The
99
behavior of governments enters in the determination of
international movements of grain (as the famous Russian
wheat deal made abundantly clear), as well as into the
nominally "government" sphere already alluded to, and it
is in modeling the behavior of the important political
actors, including the major agencies, that exceedingly
interesting and possibly intractable problems lie.
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Appendi - A
Basic Data Sources
1) Chicago Board of Trade, Statistical Annual (1956 -
1972) Henceforth SA.
2) Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Bulletin
(March 1963, February 1965, March 1966, March 1967) Hence-
forth FRB.
3) --- Business Statistics (1971, 1973) Henceforth BS.
4) --- and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Quarterly Econometric Model (January, 1973) Henceforth FMP.
5) U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service. Feed Statistics (September, 1967) and Supplement
for 1971 (July, 1972) Henceforth FS.
6) --- Food Grain Statistics Henceforth FGS.
7) --- Supplement to Food Grain Statistics (1971) Hence-
forth SFGS.
8) --- Wheat Situation (May, 1973) Henceforth WS.
9) U.S. Department of Agriculture Statistical Report-
ing Service, Statistical Bulletin 277 (January, 1961), 387
(January, 1967), and 503 (December,. 1972) Henceforth SB.
10) --- Cattle on Feed (January, 1973 and January, 1974)
Henceforth COF.
a) Quantities
Visible Supply of Grains.(millions of bushels)
Monthly: SA
Total Stocks of Grains (millions of bushels)
Quarterly: SA
Domestic Disappearances of Corn, Grain Sorghum,
Oats, and Barley (millions of bushels) Quarterly:
FS
A-I
Total Domestic Wheat Disappearance (millions of
bushels)
1.) July 1964 - June 1970, Quarterly: WS.
2.) July 1955 - June 1963, Semi-annual: FGS
Food and Industrial Disappearance of Wheat (mil-
lions of bushels)
1.) July 1964 - June 1970, Quarterly: WS.
2.) July 1955 - June 1963, Semi-annual: FGS
Total Domestic Rye Disappearance (thousands of
bushels)
1.) July 1966 - June 1971, Quarterly: SFGS.
2.) July 1955 - June 1966, Semi-annual: FGS
Cattle and Calfs on Feed in the states of Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri,
South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, Colorado,
Arizona, and California (thousands of head)
Quarterly: SB and COF
b) Prices
High and Low Futures Prices (pennies) Monthly: SA
Average price per bushel of number three barley at
Minneapolis (dollars) Monthly: FS
Average price per bushel of number two white oats
at Minneapolis (dollars) Monthly: FS
Average price per bushel of number three yellow
corn at Chicago (dollars) Monthly: FS
Average price per hundred pounds of number two
yellow grain sorghum at Kansas City (dollars)
Monthly: FS
Average price per bushel of wheat at the farm
(dollars) Monthly: SFGS
Average price per bushel of number two rye in
Minneapolis (dollars) Monthly: SFGS and FGS
c) Other
Open market rate for prime commercial paper, 4 to
6 months duration (points) Monthly: FRB and BS
A-2
Gross national product (billions of dollars)
Quarterly: FMP
Unemployment rate (points) Quarterly: FMP
Consumer price index (1958 = 1.) Quarterly FMP
Population of the U.S. (millions of persons)
Quarterly: FMP
Consumer Price index (1967 = 100.) Monthly: BS
A-3
